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VENTUJRE CAPITAL ON THE DOWNSIDE:
P REFERRED STO CI( AND CORPOR ATE
COl\JTROL
William W. Brotton *

I NTROD UCTION

When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup
companies fizzl e out, and whe n it stops raining money on places like
W all Stree t and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside
contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in th e back seat as mere
facilit ators on the upside, move up to th e front and som e times even
take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside:
to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily
on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be
separated from dysfunctional teams of business people to stem the
flow of red ink to disappointed investors. The team members rarely go
quietly , no matter how unsuccessful. The outcome can turn on
provisions in contracts entered into on the upside - cookie-cutter
paragraphs in boilerplate forms, barely noticed when the cash flows
easily.
This Article takes the occasion of the simultaneous collapse of the
high technology stock market and the failure of the dot-com startups, 1
along with the subsequent retrenchment of the venture capital
business ,2 to examine the law and economics of downside
arrangements in venture capital contracts. Th e subject matter
implicates core concerns of legal and economic theory of the firm.
Debates about the separation of ownership and control ,-' relational

Samue l Tyler R esearch Professor of Law, The George Washington U ni versity Law
School ; Visiting Professor of Law, G e orgeto wn Unive rsity Law Cente r. A.B. 1973 .
Colum bia; J.D. 1976. C olumbia. - Ed. My th anks to Jo hn Armour. Mitu Gula ti , William
Kl ein , J oe McCa hery, La rry Mitche ll , Per Strombe rg. and pa rti cipants a t the TI A S Business
School confe rence o ne- business for comments on prev io us ve rsio ns.
1. In the first seven mo nths of 2001 , 367 in te rn e t compa ni es we nt o ut of busin ess. and
nearl y 83,000 dot-co m employees were laid off. One res ult was a ma rk ed uptick in
a pplicati o ns to business school. Big Ex- Techies On Camp us. Bu s . W K.. A ug. 13,2001, at 8.
2. See Mark H ei nzL S rarting Gate, W A LL ST. L Jul y 16.2001 , at B5 (re po rting that U .S.
ve nture capita l in ves tm e nts in the first quarte r of 2001 we re $11.7 billion compa re d to $26.7
billio n in th e first qua rte r of 2000).
3. See, e.g.. Mi chael C. Je nse n, Th e tV/adem !ndusrria/ Revollllion, Exir, an d rh e Failure
of In rerna / Control Sysrem s, 48 J. FI N. 83 1 (1993) (a rguin g th a t inte rnal go ve rn a nce syste ms
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in ves tin g,-! takeo ve r poli cy, the law and cconomtcs of d e bt
capitaliza ti o n." and bankru ptcy r eform /' all grapple with the down s id e
problem of contro lling and termina ting unsuccessful manage rs for the
be nefit o f o utside de bt a nd equity investors (and the re la te d upsid e
pro blem o f incenti vizing e ffective but fallibl e m a nage rs). Th e fa cto rs
motivatin g these debates a lso bear on venture capital contra cting. But
ve nture ca pital p rese nts a special puzzle for solution. Co nve rtibl e
preferred stock is th e do minant financi a l contrac t in th e ven t ure
capital mark e t, 7 at least in the Unite d States.8 This contrasts with oth e r
contexts in corp o ra te fin ance, where preferre d stock is th o ug ht to be a
fin a ncin g ve hicle long in decline. The only mature firm s th a t fin a nce
with pre ferre d, which once was ubiquitous in America n capital
structures , te nd to be firm s in re gulated industries having littl e cho ice
in the ma tte r. T ax rules favoring debt fin a nce provide the prim a ry
ex planatio n for pre ferrecl" s declin e. But many corporate law observe rs
wo uld sugges t d ys function al downside contracting as a co ncomita nt
cause . Simply, pre ferre d pe rforms badly on the downside, whe re
senior security contracts supposedly are at the ir most effective.
Preferred stockhold ers routinely have be en victimized in distress
situations by opportunis tic issuers who strip them of the ir contract
rights, transferrin g value to the junior equityholders who control the

are failing at th e task o f achieving the downsizing and disinvestment needed by th e wider
eco nomy) .
-l. Set> . e.g . Michae l E. Porte r. Capilal Cho ices: Changing 1/z e Wa y A 111erica ln ves1.1· in
!nclusi!T. in STU DIES IN INTER I'ATIONAL CO RPOR ATE FINANCE AND GO VERN ANCE
SY STE ~IS: A CO IVIPARI SO N OF TH E U.S., J APA N. AND EU ROPE 5-17 (Dona ld H. Ch ew eel ..
1997) (arguin g fo r business Jnd law re form toward th e end o f e ncouraging re lat iona l
in ves tin g).

5. See. e.g. . Micha el C. Jens t: n. A gency Cosls of Free Cash Flo w, Corpomle Finan ce and
Tnki'nvers. ·76 Arvl. ECON . REV. PAP ERS & PROC. 323 (1986) (a rguing th a t ma nage rs put
e xcess cash into suboptima l pro jec ts nnd need to be disciplined by hi gh le ve ra ge a nd
ta keove rs) .
6. See. e.g .. THOIVI AS H. JA CKSO N. TH E LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK RU PTCY 2U9-24
( 1986) (argui ng th a t bankrupt firm s should be put up for sa le as going concerns rath e r th an
reca pita lized).
7. See. e.g .. Willi am A. Sahlm an. Th e S1ruc1ure and Governance of V el/lure- Cap iwl
Orgunizalions . 27 J. FI N. ECON. 473 (1990) ; Je ffrey J. Trester, Velllure Crzpilul Conlmuing
Un der Jlsv/1/ nzelric lnf(m n mion . 22 J. BAN KI NG & FI N. 675 (1998) .
8. Douglas J. Cummin g. The Con venible Prefared Eq uity Pu zz le in Cana dian Ve nrure
Cu[iiflll
Finun ce
(SS RN
E lec.
Pape r
Coil.
No.
218352.
2001 ).
m
http ://pape rs.ssrn .com/abs tract=2 18352 , repo rts that prefe rred is not extensive ly utili zed in
Ca nadian ve nture ca pi ta l finan cing. Thi s is eve n true with res pect to U.S. ve nture capital
firm s' in vest ments in Ca nada. D ouglas Cumming. Un iled Simes Vemuri' Cap ilal Fina ncial
Co mracting: Evidence .fi·om ln ves//1/enls in Foreign S ec uri1ies (SSRN Elec. Pape r Coli. No.
288 111. 2002). a / http ://pa pers. ss rn. com/a bs trac t=28811 1. D. Gordo n Smith & Ann alcc na
Parh ank agas. Conflic t JV!anagemenl in !h e Em repren eur- Velllure Ca pita/is! R el(l{iomh ip: A n
lmemulional Co mpurmi ve Study (wo rking pape r on fil e with author. June 2000) mak es th e
sa me report fo r Finland.
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firm's management. The cum ulati on of bad experiences adds impetus
to a wider trend in favor of debt as the mode of senior part icipat ion .
Venture capital finance is the exception to the trend. With
preferred stock as the investing vehicle of choice, the numbe r of
ve nture capita l funds increased from thirty-four with capital of $1.69
billion in 1991 to 228 funds with comm it ted capital of $67 .7 bill ion in
the pe ak year of 2000.9 Given preferred stock's history of contract
failure, two questions arise . Firs t, why do A merica n venture ca pit al ists
employ preferred instead of debt or comnwn stock , and seco nd. how.
if at alL do venture capital preferr ed contracts sol ve or avoid downside
fail ure? This A rticle draws on the economics of incomple te contracts
to offer answers to these questions.
T he first line of downside defe nse for any outside so urce of capital
is not closing in the first place . Vent ure capital contracts employ this
defense to the utmost, staging the c!rawclown s of funds over time and
cond itioning the funding commitment on pe rformance targets. If th e
stock issuer misses its targe t, the venture capitalist has the opti on of
re fusing fur ther funds. The ve nture capital ist's final line of downside
defense lies in its preferred stock redemption rights and liquidation
preference. Venture capital investments tend to have an intermediate
duration. If after five years or so the stock iss uer has not produced a
payoff in the form of an initial public offering, the venture capitalist
has the backstop right to have its stock redeemed a t the purchase
price. That right implies a power to terminate an issuer unable to fund
the redemption, along with priority rights respecting remaining assets.
Between these two lines of defense there lies a middle ground
where downside protection may also be needed. This is the gro und
taken up in this Article. Here downside protection for a venture
capitalist m eans two things - first, power to replace the firm's
managers (or, alternatively, to force premature sale or liquidation of
the firm), and second, power to protect the ven ture contract itself
from opportunistic amendm en t. Venture capital investments possess
this protection in varying degrees, depending on the mode of their
participation and the governing contracts' terms. At the bes t-protected
end of the range of possibilities lie transactions where the venture
capit alist holds a majority of the voting shares, whether common or
preferred. This imports control of the board a nd all necessary power
to effect results in the firm. Thus situated , a holder of ve nture capi ta l
preferred can block any opportunistic stripping of its priorities and
need not overly concern itself with the completeness of the protections

9. Paul Gompe rs & J os l1 Le rner. Tile Ve nwre Cupirul Revo/urion. 15 J. E CON . PERSP.
145. 151, tbl.l & n. a. (2001) . For a concise overv iew of all as pects of venture capital
co ntr ac ting. see Michae l Klausn e r & Kate Litvak. Wlior Economisrs Have T1.1ughr Us Abour
Venr ure Capiral Conrracring (SSRN Elec. Pape r Coil. No. 280024. 2001) . or
h ttp://pa pers.ssrn .com/a bstract=280024.
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specified m its contracts. At the opposite, least-protected e nd of the
range of possibilities lie transactions where the venture capitalist holds
preferred in the absence of either a voting stock majority or control of
the board of directors. With no control whatsoe ver, the venture
capi ta list has the burden of extracting protection in the form of
express tenns of the type co nve ntional in contracts governing senior
securities ~ promises to pay, negative cove nants, liquidation
prov1s10ns. conditions on commitments to ma ke additional
investmen ts. and so fo rth. In many cases these provide a cumbersome ,
unre li ab le means to achi eve the fundamental downside objective of
removing m<magcrs or forc ing a sale. To sec why, consider the
archety riccll case of a payment defa ult on a bond con tract. This is a
governance eve nt because as a practical matte r it forces a bankruptcy
reorganizaticm . But Chap ter 11 is designee! in the first instance to
prevent the remova l of managers and to ave rt a sale of the business.
T he p rocee ding will be controlled initially by the in cumbent
manageme nt, which will be biased toward the status quo and will lack
a stron g commitment toward protecting the contract rights of senior
securityholders. 10
Until recently, academic observers assumed that venture capitalists
always insist on full protection, taking voting control of their portfolio
companies' shares and dominating their boardrooms. 11 New empirical
wo rk shows that venture capitalists emerge with such full control at
both the shareholder and board level in only a significant minority of
cases. 12 In another significa nt minority of cases , th e venture capitalist
emerges at the vulnerable end of the range of protection, lacking
voting and boardroom control and relying e ntirely on terms
articulated ex ante in the preferred stock contract. In these cases, a
ri sk of exposure to issuer opportunism arises.
This Article evaluates this risk, reviewing contract terms employed
in venture capital transactions an d the case law on preferred stock. A
mi xed pict ure emerges. The terms of venture capital contracts
improve in significant respects on those of tradition al preferred stock
contracts. But they are not perfect, and they offer incomplete
protectio n from issuer opportunism. Meanwhile , the case law is as
hostile as ever. Delaware has taken the lead , sustaining a classic case
of preferred stock victim iza tion in a venture capital context. This

10. Under section l1 21(cJ of th e Bankruptcy Code. the deb tor in possession has the
exclusive ri g ht to propose a plan during the first 120 clays of a proceedin g. Section 112lJ(a),
(bJ co nt e mplates that seniors can be as ked to give up value to juniors subject to the limit
that seniors must at least rece ive liquidation value. 11 U.S.C. §§ 11 21( c). !129(a). (bJ ( 19l)4).
II. See in.fia text acco mpany in g no tes 17-20.
12. Steven Kapla n & Per Stro mbe rg, Financial Comracting Theory 1\llee/s rhe Real
World: / 111 Eillpiriml Analysis of Ven111re Capiwl Con/racrs . (SS RN E lec. Paper Coli. No.
2li:> l 75. ?.OOO).ul http://pape rs.ssrn .com/abs tract=2lol75.
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Article criticizes this approach as a matter of both contract law and
contract economics: contract law's good faith dut y can be used to
protect venture capital preferred without a cogniza ble ri sk of·
unproductive judicial interference in corpora te affairs. Th e discussion
also suggests that D elaware's adherence to th e traditional patterns of
trea tm ent of p referred is short sighted. Venture capita l contrac ts
p rese nt a unique alignment of financi al an d governance interests. A
responsive legal re gime seekin g venture capital incorporations will
tail o r its contrac t and fidu ciary principles accordingly. deve lopi ng an
eve n-handed fr amework in ·which to arbitrate disputes.
VE NT URE CAPITA L C ONTRACTS -

T H E C ON TR OL R A NGE

I

--

--- -~

I F ull Vo ting
I Con trol

Tradition al
Contracts

Shared Control

Power to
Control Assets

Weak

Incomplete
Contracting

F ull

Exposure to
Contract
Opportunism

Yes

No (stock majority)
Yes (stock minority)

No

I

I

J

The most likely venture capital transaction structure entails neither
full protection nor classic preferred stock vulnerability. In the majority
of transactions, the venture capitalist emerges at a midpoint on the
protecti on range, sharing control with the entrepreneur. Here the
defining characteristic is an open-ended balance of power in the
boardroom. The venture capitalist accordingly gets no un ilateral
power to control the assets and terminate the entre pre neur on the
downsid e. Instead th ese matters are left open to contest. In a majority
of this subset of transactions, the venture capitalist takes a majority of
the voting stock even though it does not take a majority of board
seats. The stock majority imports determinative protection against the
stri p ping of contract rights. In a significant minority of these sharedcontrol transactions, however, the entrepreneur holds a minority of
the shares with control in the boardroom being shared . This
arrangement opens up a possibility of exposure to oppo rt unism
respecting the preferred stock contract.
In sum, in a majority of venture capital transactions, the ve nture
capitalist takes a cognizable risk of not getting the results it vv ants on
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the downside. This Article addresses th e question of wh y this occurs
using a model or optim al capital structure in startup investme nt
contexts drawn from the economic literature of incomple te contracts.
T he model, which abstracts fr om the lea ding description of control
transfer be twee n e ntrepre ne urs a nd outside capitalists proposed by
P hillippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton,u le ts us explain th e patte rn of
ve nture ca pital contract ing in te rms o f the rational provision of
production
incenti ves. '-!
l'v1orc
particularly , shared
control
a rrangements are gove rn ance p rocesses that avert problems of
noncontractibi!ity. When pa rti es e nter into venture capital contracts
they are in a position to legisla te respec ting some but not all future
o utcomes. Fabulous success, for example, pre sents allocational
problems but no q uesti o ns respecting the entrepreneur's control of the
assets in the future. Tota l fa ilure is simil arly cut and dried - the
contracts trigge r liquid ation for the benefit of the venture capitalist
subject to the constra ints of the bankruptcy syste m. Middling
o utcomes are less amenable to advance specification. H e re , control
transfers implica te complex business judgments outside the scope of
existing contract technologies. Such sce narios are better suited to
treatment through the operation of a contractually instituted
governance processes th an through advance specification of a clearcut outcome. Venture capital's shared control arrangements achieve
this end, making the entrepreneur's day-to-day control of assets and
management contesta ble and facilitating control transfer at low cost
even while giving the entrepre neur some assurance that control
transfer power will not be arbitra ril y exercised.
Part I begins by setting out recent e mpirical findings on ve nture
capital contracts. Next. Part I articulates the terms of the control
allocation model of op timal capital structure of Aghion and Bolton.
Part I th en brings the rea l world contracting pattern to the mode l and
1
the model to the real world pattern. ' T his encounter expands the
model's framework , yie lding a me nu of contract specifications and
governance processes from which parties to venture capital contracts

13. Philippe A ghi o n & Pa tric k Bolto n . A n !ncomple!e C on lra Cis Approach lo Financial
Contracting . 59 REV . EC ON. STU D. 473 (1 992). In so doing. it follows the sugges tion of
Ka plan & S tro mberg. sup m no te 12 . that the Aghion-B o lton m o de l is the m os t coge nt o f the
th eore tical ex plicati o ns o f ve nture ca pita l re la tion ships. Thomas He llmann . Th e Allocation
of Com ro l Rigl11s in Venrure Capilli I Conr rucrs. 29 R AN D J. E CON . 57 (1998 ) . make s the sa m e
co mmend a ti o n.
14. Th e fit between t he Agh io n-B o lto n co ns tru c t a nd the rea l world co ntra cting pa tte rn
is no t precise . In orde r to ex pl a in th e a mbi g uo us, s ha re d contro l a rra nge me nts that d o minate
ve nture ca pital co ntrac ting. th e mod e l' s menu o f mod es of contro l transfe r a nd
dec isionm a king contin ge ncies has to be ex panded. T hi s Articl e fills in th e a clclitional menu
ite ms.
15. Fo r a noth e r di sc ussio n o f th e Ag hi o n-Bo lton m o de l and the Kapl a n a nd Stro mbe rg
res ults. see O liver H a rt. Finun ciol Cmztru ctin g . 39 J. ECON . LIT. 1079, 1084-90 (2001).
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can se lect. We emerge with a thick but workable description of co ntrol
rel a tionships between ve nture cap italists and entrepreneurs.
Part II turns to th e le ga l environ me nt and contracting practice
respectin g the prefe rre d stock. ft begins by showing the ease with
which op portunist ic m anagers have historicall y dive rted value from
preferred holders. The di scussio n then turns to venture capital
preferred , sh owin g how histo ry repeated itself in th e Delaware courts
in th e leading case co nce rnin g the rig hts of venture ca pital preferred ,
Equity-Link ed In vestors. L. P. v. Adoms. 1A Fin a lly, Part IT ret urns to
real world ve nture capi tal co ntrac tin g prac ti ce and the stra tegies it
employs to reverse th e histo rica l pattern of pre ferred exposure. The
verdict is o ne of qua lifi ed success.
The qualification is import ant , given a venture capitalist averse to
contract risk . This Articl e 's analysis implies con serva tive advice:
invulnerability to issu e r oppo rtunism pres upposes voting control of
the stock and, at a mi nim um , sha red co ntrol in the boardroom. In the
present lega l context. contract protections without control rema in
unreliable. This advice is hardly sa tisfac tory as a policy matte r.
Accordingly, the Article concludes th at the lega l framework encasing
preferred stock has not e volved in an effici ent direction.
I.

CONTROL IN VENTURE CAPITAL INV ESTM ENT: FROM PRACTI CE
TO THEORY

This Part ga thers, evaluates, and res tates the economic learning on
venture capital contracts. Section A sets out recently reported data on
business practices re specting venture capital contracts. The da ta
displace a longs tanding ass umption that venture capitalists always take
complete voting control of th eir portfolio companies. Section B
describes incomple te contracts econ omics and expla ins its
appropriateness as a fr amework o f inquiry respecting capital structure.
Section C sets out a basic incomplete contracts model of a control
transfer capital structure (the C ontrol Transfer Model, or CTM),
abstracting from research by th e economists Philippe Aghion and
Patrick Bolton. Sec tion 0 expands th e model 's analytical framework
so as to provide a working account of real world venture capital
governance structures.
A.

Contracts and Control Arrangenwnts in V enture Capital Finance

In th e once-prevailing story about ve nture capital transactions,
entrepreneurs so need venture capital that they cede both a majority
of stock and control of the boardroom. The control transfer to the
venture capitalist ( VC) is o nly temporary, howeve r. If the portfolio
16. 705 A.2cl 1040 (De l. C h. 1097) .
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company succeeds, control re turns to the e ntrepre neur (£) when VC
se ils its stock in an initi al p ublic offering ("'IP0''). 17 T hus, in Ronald
G ilson and Bernard B lack's descrip tion , th e problem for solution with
venture capital contracts is E's lack of assurance again st op portunistic
rete nti on of control by VC through undue de lay of the IPO. They
suggest that an " implicit contract" backed by reputa ti onal constraints
and fi nancial incentives assures E that VC will voluntaril y s urre nde r
th e re ins.10 No te that so long as VC has controL its senior sta tus is
complete ly pro tected. Indeed, according to Gilson and Black, the
pract ice in ve nture capital transac tions gives VC double protectio n,
in ves ti ng it with veto power over business decisions thro ugh a full set
of business covenants. 19
The VC control story, howeve r, ha:.; turned out to be incomplcte? 1
The reversal is understandable . Venture capita l transactions are
private placements. There is accord ingly no pu blic database respecting
their financ ial terms and contracting structures . Actors in the industry,
moreover, can be expected to take a proprie tary view respecting their
transactions ' documentation. T he economists Kaplan and Strombe rg
have broken new gro und just b y gathering data respecting the
contracts governing venture capital investments in 118 startups (200
separate instances of investment) made by fourteen venture capital
firms located across the country. T he data displace the standard story,
showing that VCs do not always take control of their portfolio firms. 21
The theory of the firm has a lot of explaining to do as a result.

17. BernardS . Blac k & R o na ld J. G ilso n. Venrure Capiw! and rhe Srrucru re of Capiro!
1Vl arkers: Banks Versus Srock Markers. 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243. 253. 255-56. 2<10-61 (1998).

18. !d. a t 257-64.
19. !d. at 261.
20. It also should be not e d th a t the IPO is not th e on ly m eam of VC e xit on the up sid e .
Four add iti o nal route s are ava il ab le: (1) the VC can retain all or part of its shares and se ll
th e m into the tradin g m arke t sub seq ue nt to the !PO: (2) the fi rm can be so ld to a thi rd-party
acq uire r, with the VC taki ng a sha re of me rge r conside rat io n upo n exit: (3) the VC ca n se ll
its s ha res to a third -party acquire r: a nd (4) the VC ca n sel l its s ha res back to th e issue r o r to
E. Any of th ese ex its ca n be pa rti a l o r full. For di sc ussio n of poss ibilities and practi ces.
includ ing e mpirical results in th e U.S. a nd Ca nada. see Douglas J. C umming & J e ffrey G.
Macintos h. Th e E.trel/( of Venlll re Cap ital Ex irs: Evidence from Canada and rhe Unired Swres
(SSRN Elec. Paper Coli. No. 2505ll), 2000), ar http ://papers.ssrn.com /abstract=2505l 9.
C umming an d Macintosh sugges t that the lik e lihood of ex it inc reases over time: the va lue
a dded by the VC declin es as the firm matures. management becomes more seasoned. the
firm's bus iness contacts are put in place. and product d evelopment a nd marketing issu es a re
reso lve d. D. Gordon Smith , Conrrol Over Exir in Venruri:' Cap ital Re!arionships (SSRN Elcc.
Paper Co iL No. 272231. 2001) , ar http://pape rs.ssrn.com/abstract=272231) . studies th e
reg ul ation o f exit in venture capital contracts. show in g that th e IIC comes to acquire control
ove r exi t over time .
2 1. Sig nifi ca ntl y. th e to uc hstone discuss io n of ve nture capi ta l co ntra c ting. Sahlman,
s upra note 7. a t 506. mak es no assertion respec tin g th e fre qu e ncy of VC co ntrol. It d oes note
th e incide nce of s ha re d con tro l in the boa rd room.
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Kaplan and Stromberg find that one or the oth er party, VC or E,
has control of the board in on ly 38% of their cases. In this subset, the
VC takes control in two-thirds of the cases and th e E takes control in
one-third of th e cases. Also, cases of VC contro l are more lik ely to
occur in late stage financin gs. In the remaining 62% of the cases,
neither side takes control."~ Instead, the VC and the E each designate
a direc tor for a seat or seats. They then agree on a candidate to fill the
rema ining seat or seats. Under standard corporate law on allocation of
autho rity, control of the boardroom me ans contro l of the assets and
pe rsonn el."' T he upsho t on the downs id e, ass uming confl icting vit:ws in
E a nd V C as to the best course of action , or, indeed, ass uming that VC
·wishes to rem ove E from the position of chief executive officer
(" CEO" ), is that the views and votes of th e third di rec tor are outcome
de te rminati ve.
Ka plan and Stromberg also collect dat a on vot ing control at the
shareholder level. A t this po int recall that while a majori ty of the
voting shares means boardroo m control with plain vanilla corporate
documentation, stand ard corporate practice permits shareholders to
make special contractual arrangements respecting boardroom control.
Such is the case with venture capital transactions, which te nd to
provide separate voting schemes for board election, on the one hand,
and for other matters on which shareholders vote, on the other h and.
The latter proceed on a one vote-per-share basis.2.j Accord ingly, voting
control over matte rs like charter amendments and me rgers goes to the
actor, E or VC, holding the largest number of shares. T he number of
and proportion of shares held by E and VC in turn will vary depending
on how well E performs. It is customary in venture capital contracting
to use stock ownership as a pe rformance ince ntive for E, setting out
pe rformance targets and providing that more stock vests in E as the
targets are met. Ka plan and Stromberg report that in 70.8% of cases,
the VC controls a majority of the votes, ass uming no performancebased stock allocations to the E ever come to vest. G iven full vesting,
the number of cases in which VC controls a maj ority decreases to
55.8% . E controls in 11.6 % of the cases, rising to 23.1% given full
vesting. Neither party controls in 17.6 %, rising to 21.1% given full
vesting. Some variance comes into the figures in subsets broken down
by round of investment. VC control is higher (86. 8% , no vest ing;
65.8% full vesting) in rounds conducted where the startup has not ye t
produced reve nues and lower in post revenue rounds (59.0 % no
vesting; 48.7% full vesting). T he net on the downside , where full

22. Kaplan & Stro mbe rg. supra note 12 (work ing pa pe r at 17 ).
23. See. e.g, D EL. CODE AN N. ti t. 8, § 14l(a) (2001).

24. Or, in th e case of the VC a vo te equal to the numbe r of sh ares of co mmon stock into
which its shares are convertible .
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unlikely to have occurred,

VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS- THE CONTROL RANGE
KAPLAN & STROMBERG'S RESULTS

Traditional
ContractsE Voting
Control

Shared
Control

Voting
Control in

13%

62%

25'Jo

11.6%
23.1%

17.6%
21.1%

70.8%
55.8%

vc

I

Power to Control Assets I
Control of Board of
Directors

Exposure to Contract
Opportunism
Majority of Voting Shares
No Vesting
Full Vesting

I

Kaplan and Stromberg show strong correlations between share
voting control and board control. Where VC has voting control, VC
also has board control in 22.5% of the cases, but board control is
shared in 70% of the cases where VC has voting control. Where VC
never has voting control, board control is shared in 58.1% of the cases;
E controls in 38.7% of the cases. Where VC has voting control subject
to divestment given E equity vesting, board control is shared in 94.1%
of the cases. A correlation between voting rights and cash flow rights
also can be noted. The VC mean economic ownership claim in all
transactions assuming no vesting is 55.7% and47.6% with full vesting.
Finally, Kaplan and Stromberg report that in 15% of the cases, the
documentation defines a state of unacceptable suboptimal
performance in advance by reference to financial information and
provides for a state-contingent transfer of control to the venture
capitalist. 25
Summing up, shared control in the boardroom is the dominant
governance mode in the portfolio companies in Kaplan and
25. Kaplan & Stromberg. supra note 12 (working paper at 59 tbl. 6. 60 tbl. 7).
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Stro mberg 's sample. It eve n prevails in a majorit y of the cases where
on e or the oth e r of VC orE has a majorit y o f votin g shares. But , a t th e
sam e time , V C and E each have boardroom cont ro l in significant
numbers of portfolio companies. This data complicates the
explanatory task for theory of the firm. The qu estio n is ne ith e r why
VC co ntrol. nor why E control. It is , first, why shared control in most
ca ses with outli e r cases of VC control a nd E contro l? Second, how, if
at a ll , do the sha red control arrangem ents described in Kapl an a nd
StrC"imhc:rg·s samp le function so as to assure full rea li zation of a given
startup·s profit potential?
B.

In complete Contracts Th eo ries of th e Firnz

T hi s A rti cle's principal asse rtion is th at the value of shared co ntrol
lies in th e fact tha t it m akes E's day- to-day control of asse ts and
manage ment co ntes tabl e, facilitating control transfer a t lo w cost eve n
as it gives E a degree of ass urance against arbitrary a nd capricious
exercise of th at control transfer power. To see why these factors are
important, look at the situation ex ante, before VC commits its money.
VC knows th a t E could have a valuable business ide a even while
simultaneously turning out to be a poor manager. E knows tha t VCs
bring this skeptical point of view to their review of portfolio
companies , but E also knows that VCs are not immune to adverse
selection and may not be infallible in their business judgments. Both
parties also know that as events unfold , E and VC may interpre t them
differently, with E as the inside party h aving an advantage respecting
hard information. There res ults a nascent conflict of interest, which
m ay or may not ripen de pending on futur e events. A shared control
arrangement holds out advantages as a solution. It gives VC a
governance structure that contemplates ex ante that a profess ional
m a nager may have to replace £.At the same time , shared control lets
E take charge of the business without being VC's a t-will employee, as
would be the case if VC had control of the board. Th e shared-control
arrangement leaves the ma tter of E 's pe rformance eva luation open
and waits for eve nts to unfold.
VC will want to take control of the assets and replace E on a
mod erate downside scenario2 6 the portfolio company still has
prospects but E does not appear to be equipped to rea lize them. Such
mediocre or poor performance can stem from adverse selection or
moral hazard problems. In e ither case , it would not give rise to conflict
of interest and contracting problems between E and VC in a world

26. A ca ta st roph ic downside sce na ri o arises whe n th e portfolio co mpa n y·s business has
n o prospects und e r a nyone "s man ageme nt. H e re V C contracts in th e e nd prov id e for
te rmin a tion with th e VC taking the c rumbs off th e tabl e. See infra text accompanying no te
149.
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where E derives no private benefits from the control of assets. Oliver
Hart shows that in such an ideal (and taxless) world, first-best results
easi ly can be achieved with an ali-common-stock capital structure and
a simple incentive compensation system. Hart describes a simple twoperiod situation where the firm is founded at t = 0 and liquidated at t =
2, with an intermediate decision respecting liquidation or continuance
to be made at t = 1, along with a dividend payment. Hart would make
the compensation of the managing participant E depend entirely on
the dividend d. That i:s. incentive compensation 1 should equal "P(dl +
d2)," where P is a proportion of the firm 's total returns. If the
payment also covers a proportion of liquidation proce eds L - I =
P[dl + (d2, L)j - E can be expected to make an optimal decision
respecting liquidation at t = 1. If the expected value of liquidation
returns at t = 1 is greate r than the to tal returns expected at t = 2, the
firm is liquidated at t = 1 and no cost ly contracting designed to align
the manager's incentives with those of outside investors is necessary. 27
Under this incentive structure there is no ex ante prospect of firm
continuance in the event of poor results.
The real world problem is that managers like E do derive private
benefits from asset management. In Hart's conception, the bribe
required to align their incentives with those of the outside security
holders is unfeasibly large. 28 Accordingly, a complex capital structure
must be devised in order to align incentives in the direction of optimal
investment and management and to ensure that the actor with the
appropriate incentives controls the assets.
Incomplete contracts models of capital structure seek to describe
such incentive-compatible capital structures. They start with a
common sense definition of contracts: contracts are comprised of
advance specifications of future results. To the extent that a given
outcome cannot successfully be specified in advance, the subject
matter is noncontractible. The models make three assertions about
corporate contracts and capital structures. First, corporate contracts
can be expected to omit important future vari ables because of the
difficulty or impossibility of ex ante description. That is, the particular
posture of events on which crit ical governance outcomes will later
depend may not be sufficiently specifiable in advance so as to permit
the parties to draft in advance a contract term setting out appropriate
instructions. Second , corporate contracts can be expected to omit
27. OLIVER HART, FIRMS. CONTRA CTS, AND FINANCIAL STRU CTURE 146-48 (1995);
see aiso Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer. Robusr Financial Conlracling und rhe Role of
Venlure Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994) (setting forth the fixed fraction model of venture
capitalist participation).
28, See HART, supra note 27, at 146-48. The treatment of Hellmann, supra note 13.
should be contrasted at this point. In that set up, E's private benefits from control may be
outweighed by the upside prospects of a payoff on E's common stock in the firm, which
payoff will be realized only if E gives up controL
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importan t future variables due to the difficulty or impossibility of ex
post observation and verification. 29 That is, eve n if the parti es can
anticipate and describe future contingencies, once eve nts have
unfolded in the future , no concrete factu al basis may exist for the
operation of an advance legislative directive. To enforce a contractual
specification, you must be able to make a proof in court. Complex
facts of business life do not always lend themselves to such
presentations, especially by those outside the firm, whether
uovernment
regulators or VCs. Meanwhile, hard accounting numbe rs
0
prod uced by a firm do not by themselves direct business judgments
an d are in any e vent subject to ma nipulation by ins iders. A nd
noncontractibility may obtain because the requ isite tra nsactional
technologies do not yet exist. 30 Third, given the forego ing problems of
noncontractibility, important outcomes in corporate contracts will be
de termined not by advance specification but by the firm's structure of
ownership. The sp ecification of th e owner and any associated
contingent control allocations built into the firm's contracts - in
particular the contracts making up the capital struct ure - substitute
for contract terms absent clue to the condition of contractual
incompleteness. 31
As the zone of noncontractible contingencies expands, the
ownership specifications become more important. Ownership and
control of the assets will not be vested in perpetuity in a single actor,
because doing so would both imply a low-powered performance
incentive and leave the firm without defense against adverse selection
and opportunism. In this conceptualization, the firm's present owners
are the actors who direct its ongoing management and investment
policies, or, in the alternative, who determine whether to sell or
~

~

29. For co ntributions to th e lite rature mak ing this point, see Sa nford J. G rossman &
Oliver D . Hart, Th e Co sts and B enefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertiwl and Larem/
lmegmrion. 941. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Olive r Hart & John Moore. ln cunzp/ere Co mruc1s
and Ren egotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988) [here inafte r H art & Moore. ln culllpiele
ConiraC!s]; Be ng t Ho lmstrom & PaullVIilgrom , Multi/ask Principui-Agenr l lnulyses: ln cen rive
Contracts, Asser Ownership, and Job Design. 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991) (s pecia l issue)
(showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to verifiabl e measures can di vert
effort and attentio n fr om other more important but less easil y meas ured aspec ts of
performance).
30. Unlike most law and economics, which te nds to include a ny voluntary eco nomic
re lat ion within its no tion of the ex ante contract , incompl e te co ntrac ts th eo ry restricts th e
reach of the ex ante contract to cases where actors make explicit specificatio ns about the
future. That is, to have "contrac t" ' te rm s that gove rn future states. those contingent sta tes
must be specifie d and th e future outcomes must be co mputable. Sin ce many future sta tes of
nature clea rl y are not computable , transac ting parties as a resu lt lack the techno logy
ne cessary to e nabl e the negotiation and composition of a contract te rm ex ante. See Luca
And e rlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Written Conrracls: Undescriboble Sliltes of Nat ure.
109 Q.J. EcoN. 1085 (1994).

31. See Aghion & Bo lton. supra note 13, at 479.
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liquid ate th e firm. '" In th e event of suboptimal performance, co ntrol
tra nsfer to a n ac tor possessin g mo re compa tibl e incentives m ay be
advisa ble. T he firm' s perfo rm ance thus depe nds on the incentives not
on ly of its present owners but of its contingent future own ers. Optimal
capital structure depe nds on the co ntrol tra nsfe r arrangements th a t
shape these in centives. 3'
Significa ntly, inco mplete contracts economics mak es no reso rt to
" implicit co ntrac ts " as it de scribes govern ance structures. Th e term
implicit co ntrac ts , as used in law and eco nomics , d escribes
co un te rparty condu ct th at a given contract party expe cts (oft en in a
situati on o f tru st or re liance) , but as to which no explicit req uire m e nt
exists in th e con tract. Such expecta tions often arise respec tin g future
e vents as to w hich con tractua l specifi ca tion satisfying all parti es is
d ifficult or imp ossible. Implicit contracts fill these gaps. But the y do
no t do so as implied , legally enforceable duties, as do the imp li ed
contracts of contract law . In the law a nd economics usage, no lega l
constraints follow fr om the id entification of an implicit contract. More
often than not , the dependent party is left exposed to co unte rparty
opportunism and remitted to self-prot ection throu gh ex plicit
contracting th e next time around. In giving this instruction, the
implicit contracts approach m a kes a significant assumption- that the
zo ne of contractibility is universal and th at incomplete contracts
a lways can be compl eted. Give n tha t assumption , it appears to make
good policy sense to deploy the law so as to force the parti es to
conclude their own contracts rath er than insert contract terms devised
by judges ac ting ex post. 34
Incomple te contracts economics h olds out a distinctly di ffe ren t
approach to cont racts because it does not assum e unive rsa l

32. Notably. ·· owne r·· is here speci ally defined as the party who ha s the rig ht to co ntro l
a ll aspec ts of the asse t th a t have not bee n give n ove r to co ntrac tual specifica tio n ex ant e.
G rossma n & Hart. supra note 29, at 695. U nder th is de finition. owne rshi p an d co ntr o l
ca nn ot be sepa rated. alth ough th ey can be sha re d. Since asse t co ntrol is owne rship. residual
cla ima nts who do no t man age are not ow ners. whate ve r the law 's -::o nte mplati o n .
33. It sh o uld be not ed that the basic asse rti o ns of the incomp le te con trac ts school are a
s ubj ect of de bate in economic th eory. See Eric Mask in & Jean Tiro le, Unfores een
Conringencies an d lncomple!e Co mraus, 66 REV. ECO N. STU D. 83 (1 999), fo r an arg um e nt
th a t pa rties can indeed design con tra cts tha t ove rcome th e proble ms th e school describes as
" noncontractibl e." a nd th at irre levance obtains as between a n in com pl e te contract le ft ope n
to ex post renegoti a tion a nd a co ntract with desc ribed tra des. The response appears in
O live r H a rt & John Moo re, Fo undacio ns of Incomplele Conrracls, 66 R EV . E CON . STUD . 115
(1999) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Foun dations] .
34. See Frank H. Easterbroo k & Daniel R. Fisc he l. Conlracl and Fiduciary Dury, 36 J .L.
& ECON . 425. 445 (1993) (asserting a pres um ptio n in fa vor of for cing parties to ge t th eir own
co ntracts). At the sa me tim e, gaps ca n be fi lled in when th e de cisionmaker kno ws what th e
acto rs wou ld have agre ed on in a cos tless co ntracting e nvironment. See, e.g., J effrey N.
Go rd on. Th e !vfan dato ry Srru cl!lre of Co rp orate Law , 89 COL UM . L. REV. 1549, 1550-52
(1989). To the au th or's kn owledge, the la tter principle has never bee n brought to bear to
pro te ct a seni or securityholder.
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contractibility. Indeed, it holds th a t transacting actors can create
producing in stitution s that assuredly evolve toward th e first-best only
to the extent that they dea l with con tractible subject matter. Absent
contractibility, we necessarily a rc in a second -best world , where the
function of economics is to id en tify and explain barriers that prevent
the evolutio n of first-best transactio n structures. In this second-best
world, no all-pervasive presumption aga inst regulation arises. Where
subject matter is nonco ntrac tibl e. problems have to be sorte d out ex
post. and it makes no se nse to remit parties to ex ante contract. lt does
no t necessarily foll ow that a give n judicial or othe r regula tory
interven tion will mo ve actors in a productive direction. In th eo ry ,
given ideal circumstan ces. incomplete ness only mea ns that the pa rties
the mse lves re negotiate ex post once the requisite facts are on the
table. ~'i In the re al world. howeve r, such ren egotiat ions do not
necessarily occur unde r id eal co nditions. D e te rminations about the
desirability of judicia l int ervent ion to protect against opportunism
accordingly have to be made case by case.

C.

The Contingent Control Model

There follows a contingent control transfer model ("CTM")
abstracted from precedent work by Aghion and Bolton so as to appear
in an accessible form keyed to the description of real world venture
capital arrangements. 36 The CTM is well suited to the exposition of the
control transfer problem in venture capital contexts. 37 This section
recounts its main properti es. The section that follows discusses its
implications for real world venture capital contracting.

1.

Th e Setup

Once again we ge t a two-period model built on a stylized picture of
the relationship between E and VC. The two-period framework
follows the life of a firm from birth to liquida tion, facilitating a
d ynamic inquiry into the incentive effect s of different capital
structures. An amount K is invested in th e firm at t = 0; all of K comes
from VC. The firm is liquidate d at t = 2, when mone tary returns rare
35. The di spute bet ween Mask in & T irole a nd H ar t & Moore. see supra no te 33 , in part
turns on whether the parties credibly can commit no t to re negoti a te. If they can, th en th e
case for in vesting reso urces in adva nce specifica ti o n stre ngth e ns. See Hart & Moore,
Foundations, supra no te 33. a t 128.
36. See Aghion & Bolton. supra note 13. at 479. The mode l is applied in the co ntext of a
di scussi on of divid end policy in William W. B ratt on, Dividends, Noncontmctibility, and
Corporare La w. 19 CA RDOZO L. RE V. 409. 429-34 (1997). For contrasting theoretical
pictures of control tra nsfe r in senior-junior securi ty ho lder cont exts, see G. Mitu Gulati et
a!.. Conn ected Co ntmcts. 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 908-18 (1999): D. G o rdon Smith, Team
Production in Venrure Capita/Investing. 24 J. COR P. L. 949 (1999).
37. See Kaplan & Stromberg. supm note 12.
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realized . T he a mount of the p ayo ut will depend on an action a to be
taken from among the set of fea sible act ions A by the actor in con trol
of the firm aft er the rea lization of a sta te of nature 8 at t = 1. T h ere are
only two possi ble future states of nature, a good business state e~ and a
bad busin ess sta te 8". D iffere n t actions a will be optimal depending on
which sta te occurs. M ore parti culatl y, action set A con ta ins o nly two
possible action s, o, and a,, in each of the two states o f nature 8~ and 8".
In state 8, the m aximi zing choice of actio n o '' is a,. and in state e" the
first -best choice of action a* is o1, . Just which 8 is going to occur is not
cle ar at i = 0, vvhen E and VC ente r into a contract wh ich m us t ad d ress
the contingency of respectin g the future choice of n. At t = 1,
immediately prior to the time for the cho ice oi u, t he ope rat ion of the
busine ss will produce a signals as to the ~; ta t:.; of nature 8, or 8/·~
CONTINGENT CONTROL M ODEL -

Investment

Signals
as toe

t= 0

T IM E SEQUE N CE

Rea li za tion o f K

returns r

t= 2

Action a taken

II
T h e model works the classic conflict-of-inte rest problem between

E and VC through this fra mework. T he inte rests come into conflict
because re turns to E and VC are received in different forms such th a t
cho ices of different actions a can impac t them differentially:'')
Mo netary returns of the project r are payable to VC at t = 2, minus
amounts of compensation payable to E pursuant to a compensation
schedule in t he contract concluded at t = 0 by E and VC. T he
compensation arran gement provides a transfer t ;:: 0, the precise
amo unt of which is a function of s and r. T h us VC's payout y = r - t.
38 . Ag hion & Bolto n . supra note 13. a t 475-n. The mode l a lso ass um es th at E ha s no
wea lth and needs to fi nan ce the e ntire sta rtup cost K for he r proj ect. A number of ad diti ona l
assu mpti ons are made . There are on ly two possible outcome s for s. ()o r 1. wi th s = 1 meanin g
that it is more proba ble than not th a t 8 = 8,. and s = 0 me a nin g that it is m ore probable than
no t t hat () = 11,,. In o rder to ma ke th e initial investmen t of K p lausible . th e p robabilit y q of)',
+ (! - q)y,, > K. In add iti on. there a re only two possibl e re turns rat r = 2. e ither 0 o r 1. and
the initia l co ntrac t between E a nd VC m ay be renego tiated a fter the rea li za tion of 8, with a ll
the barga ining power lyi ng with E. /d. at 477-79.
39. The mode l assumes that bot h E a nd VC are risk ne utral as to income. /d. a t 476.
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Critically, E also receives significan t, nonmonetary private ben efits b ,
such as reputation, \vhich are not also received by VC. The quantum
of b is a legitima te part of the overal l yie ld o f va lue from th e project ,
but is neither observable nor ve rifi able by third parties. Yie lds of both
r and b will depend on the state of nature e and the choice of a. E's
yield is a function of r(a ,e) + b(a,e), and VC's yi e ld is so lel y a function
r(o ,e) . The conflict of interest devolves on the choice o f a because
the choice of a can diffe rentiall y impac t r and b , and open up a
significant differential of returns be tween VC and £. ~
E and VC confront significant problems of noncontractibility a t t =
0. It would be easy if the state of nature 8 cou ld be specified ex ant e.
Then it might be possible fo r the contract betwee n E and VC to direct
th e party in control , presumably E, to ta ke a jointly max imizing actio n
u ' · Un fortun ate ly e is im possible or very costly to descri be ex ante,
although the parties will be abl e to identify e ex post, at t = 2. The
model does, however, ass ume th a t eve n thou gh the £- VC contract
cannot b e m ade directly contingent on e, it can be made co ntingent on
th e signals, which is verifiable although imperfectly corre lated with e.
Even so, the occurrence of s at r = 1 does no t enable the drafting of a
complete contract. Even if s perfectly correlated with e, the project
still would be too complex to permit an ex ante specification of the
optimizing response a~ or a,, upon the realization of s. Although the set
of choices will be limited to a" and n,, the model makes the realistic
assumption that both will lie wholly within the realm of traditional
management business judgment to be exercised by the actor in control
of th e firm. Neither is susceptible to direct specification or to indirect
specification through a constellation of a ffirmativ e and negative
covenan ts. 4 1
Th e upshot is tha t the capital structure 's allocation of control rights
between E and VC will determine the choice of a and the level of
value , optimal or suboptimal, yielded by th e firm. ~ 2 The capital
structure, as set out in the £- VC contract , inevitably specifies an
allocation of control which in turn determines which actor has the
privilege to chose action a. Control can lie in E or in V C or in both.

of

11

40. Aghion & B o lton, supra no te 13 . at 476 . G iv en th e specific a tion of fir s t bes t action a,
and a,, the e xpec ted re turns y a nd pri va te be ne fit s b reali ze d by VC and E in B, and B/> w ill
ha ve th e foll o win g pro perties:
·

yFJp., + b(-lp., > yOp,, + b(-IJ'"
yO,,a" + bO,,a/> > yB,,a, + bB,,a,
41. Direct specification mi ght be poss ibl e in a d iffe re nt case. whe re a, a nd a,. e ntail a
selectio n be twe e n a limite d se t of cho ice s identifia ble in adv a nce - for · e xample , eith e r
m e rger, liquidat io n. or sa le o f a ssets. But eve n give n th e feasibility o f th a t so rt or
specifi ca tion, ex post judicial e nforce m e nt of the co n trac tual directive could still fa ll short o f
fe as ibility if info rmati o n asy mmetri es le d to prob lems of third-party ver ificatio n . Aghion &
Bo lton, supra note 13. at 477-78.

42. !d. a t 476-77.
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T he CTM works through the scenarios of E contro l. V C co ntr o L and
joint control to asce rtain the di s tan ce betwee n th e se t of results built
in by the ince ntive structure and fir st-be st set of result s. W h e re E
con trols. a fir st-bes t choice of act ion follow s a ut omat ically onl y w he n
th e choice of a''' a lso happens to m axi mi ze y, b. and the transfe r
payment r. H e re E s incentives are p e rfe ctl y align ed with th e ge nera l
~ <~ximizing res ult. 4 ~ But. given th e way th e CTM is set u p. on so m e
outcomes th e incentives are misa lign e d - whe n E co ntro ls. its private
benefits ca use it to make the wro ng cho ice o n a bad outcom e . VC s
cho ice o f act ion is subopt im a l on a good outco me.
Th e CT M run s tvvo modes of work ing around th e mi sa lign e d
in ce nti ves . The first is Coa sian bargaining. m odeled on th e assumpti o n
th a t th e e ntr e preneur has all th e bargaining powe r.'J The seco nd is
control tran sfe r spec ified in advance in the E- VC contr ac t and
tri ggered by th e sign a ls.
2.

Coasian Bargaining

It is a trui sm of law and economi cs th a t even given misa ligned
ince ntives, an optima l result, here a*, can result from a ro und of
Coasian bargaining ex post. Given subject matter presentin g
contractibility problems, Coasian bargaining is a p a rticul a rly attractive
alternative b e cause it lets the parties le ave the m a tter ope n e x ante,
saving o n transaction costs an d avoiding use of dysfunctional
provisions. In the CTM, a round of negotiation would occ ur afte r th e
rea liza ti on of s at r = 1 in which a non contro lling party benefitte d by
the choi ce of a* purchases its choice by th e controlling party with a
sid e payment. 45 Ass umin g 8", we speak of a case wh e re a * = a", but the
private benefit return b to E yielded by a choice of a suboptima l
c hoice of a~ is g reat e r th a n value of b yie lded by the c hoice of a*. In
6
addition, the yield of y to VC is gre ater if a* is chosen over
For
simplicity , th e mod e l assumes that E has a ll th e barga ining powe r.
Give n th e abov e a li gnme nt of va lues, E will o ffer to choose a * (he re
8,,a") if VC pays E the sum e qu al to th e diffe rence betwee n th e valu e
of y yie lded on th e choice of a* and the va lue of y yie lde d on a
suboptima l choice of a. 47 VC can be expected to acc ept th e offer
provid ed th at the amo unt offered is grea ter th an its origin al

a/

43. !d. a t 480-8 I.
44 . The mod e l ass um es that th e world is full of venture capitalist s but contains only a
few entre preneurs with good projec ts. E as a resu lt has all th e barga inin g powe r: E ca n make
a tak e -it-o r-leave-it offer whi ch VC wi ll accept so lo ng as the dea l ho lds o ut an ex pe cted
r e turn of a t leas t K. !d. at 480-i\2.
45. See H ART. supra no te 27. a t 98 (d iscussing th e Aghion-Bolton mod e l).
46. Th a t is. b((),,a) + 1 > b(O,.a,) + t. and y(B,.a,,) > y(B,.aj
47. Tha t is. y(B,.a,,) - y(O,p). prov ide d tha t b(B,.a,.) + 1 + y(B,,a,.)- y(Op);::: b(B,.a) + 1.
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investme nt K. ~x Assu ming 8", then a''' = o", and a ro un d of bargaining
res ults if th e private benefit ret urn b to E yielded by a suboptimal
choice of a~> is gre Z~ter than the yie ld of b o n Zl cho ice of a* and the
yield of y to VC is g reZ~ter where a* is chosen over ai> .4 Y Since E has all
th e bargaining power. E will offer to choose ((' (here 8JtJ if VC pays
E the difference between the va lue of y yielded on th e ·choice of a'''
and the value of y yie lded on a sub optima l choice of a. 50 Once again,
VC can be ex pected to accept th e offer provided th a t th e amount
offe red is greate r than its origina l inve stment K. Stated d iffe rently, on
a bad state wit h E in co ntro l, if the in crease in re turns to VC th at
results from substi tut in g an optimal cho ice of action is gre ater th an the
di ffe ren ti al in returns to E th at results from aba ndo ning the
s uboptimal act ion. then VC, given the signal of a bad outcome, vvi1l
bribe E with a payment that at least makes up E s differen tia l so long
as the returns to VC net of the payments pay back at leas t its origin al
investment and make it better off th a n it wou ld be wi th the subop timal
ch oice.
The proble m is that, give n the CTM's se t up, Coas ian bargaining
do es not always lead to an efficient r es ult. This insuffi ci e ncy stems
from the fact that renegotiation lead ing to a* does not result in every
case . The model assumes , realisticall y e nough, th a t the re turn of a t
least K constitutes a rationality co nstraint for VC. Thus, the
renegotiation fa ils and the first-bes t res ult will not be chosen if the
value of K is so high th at it exceeds the yield on offer by E. Th e very
possibility that this situ ation co uld arise has destabilizing implications
for the whole deal : VC can be expected to r efuse to inves t at t = 0
unless som e form of pro tection against E's o pportunism is included in
the contract package .' 1
In general, Coasian bargaining fails to ass ure optimal results in
midstrea m corporate contexts where the interests of the party

48. That is. y(R,a) 2 K.
49. T hat is. wh e re h(Op) + 1 > /;((}p) + I, a nd v (Op) > v(O,o,).
50. Tha t is, y(O,u)- }'(0/1 1) . pro vided that b({lJl) + 1 + y(O,a)- y(&p,.) 2 bi&p,) + 1.
51. See Ag hi on & Bo lto n. supra note 13. at 480-83. The CTM run s th e VC co ntrol
scenario with simil a rly eq uiv ocal res ults. Here fir st-best choi ces of action will foll ow on ly
whe re th e cho ice of a th at maxi mi zes y happens to be a*. me a ning that VCs ince ntives are
perfectly align e d with the genera l maximi zing res ult. Whe re the choice of a th at ma ximize s y
is not first-best th ere can be roo m for Pareto-improvi ng renego tiati on in the form of a bribe
paid to the actor in contro l by the actor d isadva ntage d by th e subop tim a l choice of a. But
once again, it turn s out that th e opt ima l choice a* does not resu lt in every case. The mod e l's
re asonabl e a ssumpti o n of a wea lth co nstraint o n E 's pa rt ( VC provides all of K) substanti a ll y
limi ts the possibilit y o f re negotiation where V C controls. Sim ply put. since h and 1 constitute
E's e ntire wealth. E lacks the reso urces to mak e the bribe . For VC cont ro l to assure first-be st
res ults, th en , the amo unt o f 1 has to be set high e nough to give E sufficient cash fo r th e bribe .
But this adjust ment, in turn. return s us to the same piace as the searc h for the firs t- bes t
und e r E co~ tr ol. As 1 increases. projected in vestm en t returns to VC fall short of [( at some
point and VC refuses to in vest. !d. at 483 -84.
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controlling the assets (usually E or management) in the conduct of the
business differ from those of contributors of capital (usually VC or
outside eq uity). This generalization is intuitively attractive, and it
obtains eve n in the absence of bargaining costs . endowm en t effects, or
collective action problems, the latter being the factor usu a lly cited
against midstream renegotiation of corporate contracts. 52 The ke y to
the res ult is the CTM's ascription of bargaining power to E. 'vVith that
power. E can negotiate VC down to an ex post return y that is less
than VCs original investment K That res ult kills the deal ex ante. In
the rea l wo rld , in the absence of fiduci a ry const raints. protective
contrac t terms, or an immediately exercisable continge nt control
power to terminate E, E will have significant bargaining power a long
the iincs assumed in the CTM. The power ar ises in the first instance
from the informatio n asymmetries fav ori ng E. Cost:-; and other
fricti o ns in the way of E 's re moval enhan ce that bargaining power. As
the pO\vcr grows, VCs investm ent returns shrink.
[t follows, logically enough, that VC (or any other outside e quity
inves tor) needs one of three things - fiduciary protection, protective
contract terms , or an immediately exercisable contingent control
power. The CTM proceeds to the third of these alternatives .
3.

Control Transfer by Advance Specification

The CTM employs the device of contingent control to solve the
problem presented by the misalignment of the incentives of E and VC
so as to yield results superior to that of Coasian renegotiation. T wo
additional assumptions have to be made to support the contingent
control device's o peration - that VC's re turns are higher when a
suboptimal choice of a is mad e in 8~ states , and that E's returns are
higher when a suboptimal choice of a is made in 81> sta tes. 53 With this
alignment, VC will make a first-best choice in 8" and E will make a
first-b es t choice in 8~, and a contract that accords control to VC in 81>
and E in 8, will be optimal. These assumptions reflect an appea ling
intuition about the governance of startups. E knows the business and
should not be disturbed on 8~ scenarios. But since E also derives
private benefits from control of the business, E is ill suited to make an
optimal choice of business plan, or an optimal decision between
termination and continuance, in eh states.
Since 8 is unverifiable, the feasibility of a contingent control
arrangement depe nds on the degree of correlation betwe en s and 8. 54
Given the requisite correlation, an optimal arrangement can be made
52. See. e.g.. John C. Coffee. Jr. . The Manduiorv Fna bling /Jalan ce in Corpora/e LaiV:
An Essay on1he .lwlicial Role. 8Y COLUiVI. L. RE V . 161 8. 1664-65 ( l989).

53. T hat is, that y0/1, < yB,a, and that bO"a" < bO,,a,.
5-I. Aghion & Bolton . supra note l3 , at 484-86.
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operati onal with relati ve ease in a world with a fric tionl ess ban krup tcy
process. Thus does th e CT M use a co ntract provisio n to ave rt
difficulties stem ming fro m the noncontractib le na ture of e. M ore
particularly, VC's participation in th e firm ta kes th e form of debt. T he
realiza tion of sat r = 1 is m ade a de fa ul t/no-default event, with defaul t
occurrin g in a eli state. 51 ln the eve nt of defaul t, E be comes bankrupt
and VC takes co ntrol , choosi ng the fi rst -best a; in 8~ sta tes there is no
default and E stays in charge .56 T he same res ul t ca n be effe cted with
preferred stock (in a fr ict ionl ess world ). T he rea lization of s signaling
a n ehstate trigge rs a rede mption of VC s stock. H E does not have a
source of substi tute capita l, the du ty to re dee m ca uses bankrup tcy and
the same result as deb t fina nce .57
4.

lmplicmions

The CTM has a n umber of int uitive ly attrac ti ve implications. The
assertion that hard-wired contingent co ntrol tra nsfers domina te ove r
backroom renegotiati ons resona tes we ll. The model also raises a
pertinent questi on respecting the relative effectiv e ness o f employment
contracts and control transfer structures as means of channelling E's
incentives in producti ve directions. The model implies that where
crucial management choices - selections of a from se ts A - are
noncontractibl e due to problems of observability and ve rifiability and
where E enjoys private benefits, monetary ince ntive schemes based on
firm profitability or stock marke t performance cannot be expected to
import adequa te discipline. Control structures allowing outsider
investors to take act ions that managers dislike in th e event of poor
firm performa nce, although a second-bes t soluti on, can be expected to
do a more effecti ve job of mani p ula ting management incentives in
productive directions. 53
But the CTM 's exclusive reli ance on bankruptcy control transfer
makes its transition to real worl d prac tice problematic. Bankruptcy,
after all , is a dras tic and costly step to have to take. T he next section
works pas t this sticking point.

55. The prece dent mod e l is in Jai m e F . Zen de r. Oprin w l Finan cial lnsrrum enrs, 46 J.
F IN. 1645 ( 1991).
56. Ag hi o n & Bol to n. supm no te 13. a t 487 .
57. Provided the re is no t a significant a mount of debt. whic h by d efinition is se ni o r to
VC's preferred stock, in the capita l stru cture.
58. Ma thias D ewa tripont & Jea n T iro le. A Theo ry of D ehr and Eq uit1·: Di versi fy of
Securiries an d Man ager-Shareho lde r Con gru ence. 109 Q .J. E CON. 1027 -28 (1994).
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Th e CTM and the Role ofSenior Securities in Venture Capiro!
Contracring

This section moves th e CTM a step in the direction of th e real
wo rld practice describe d in Secti on A by relaxing so me ass um ptions
and ex panding the m enu of co ntract ua l dev ices implicating co ntro l
and control transfer.
A t first inspect ion, the data set out in Section A appear to suggest
that the CTM's anal ytical structure lacks predict ive power in the
ven ture capi tal context. Reca ll th a t th e mos t lik e ly rea l wo rld
arrange ment is shared cont ro l. and the next most li ke ly is ves tin g of
contro l in on e party or the o th e r. Contingen t control transfer devices
h ase d on advance specificat ion of an s show up in a minority of the
cases . Bu t th e data none the less instant iate th e CTM's d yn am ic in
significant ways. For o ne thing . th e re al wor ld ve nture capital
co ntracts· boardroom-control arrange me nts have to b e read toge ther
with their financia l prOVISIOns. T hese invariably provid e for
rede mption of the preferred held by VC in the intermediate term. This
means that in an extreme e, state the contracts provide for a
bankruptcy transfer of control, exactly as predicted by the CTM. On
the o ther hand , the CTM h as less immediate relevance with respect to
control transfer in e, states where turn around remains a possibility
and e~ states where retenti on of E will be profitable but suboptimal.
But the fram ework can be adopted to assist our understandin g of
these situations.
T he CTM 's limitations stem from two compon ents. First, it effects
its contingent control transfer through a bankruptcy proceeding on the
assumption that bankruptcy is frictionless. In the re a l world ,
bankruptcy costs are onerous.w Ve nture capital prac tice shows us that
th ese costs do not have to be incurred to e ffe ct a contingent control
transfer. Second, the m ode l limits itse lf to a contract term as it
a ttempts to dea l with the problem of noncontractibility. In so doing it
hypothesizes an imperfect but pl a usible element of contractible
subj ect matter: A lthough
is un ve rifi able, the trigger s is ve ri fiable
even though it is not a p erfect proxy for e. But what of cases wh e re no
reli able s exists, or where the parties cannot agree on one? In these
cases some ot her control transfer device must be employed. The
discussion that follows expands the me nu of possibilities to include
processes implicating control transfer and operating o n an open-e nded
basis, dispensing with contrac tual triggers.

e

5LJ . See. e.g .. Edwa rd I. Altm a n. A Furrher Empirical ln vcsriga rion of rh e Bankmp rcy
Cost Q uestion. 39 J. F IN. 1067 (ILJ84) (e stimating tota l bankruptcy cos ts to be 20% o f the
va lu e of the firm) .
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Bankruprc v Versus B oardroom Co ntrol Tmmfer

The CTM's assumption that co ntrol transfe r occurs on a
bankruptcy scenario can be relaxed ea sily by refe re nce to sta nd a rd
tools of corporate law practice . In a close cor po ra tion co ntex t, chan ges
of control in th e bo ardroom ca n be co ntract ed for in advance, e ven if
the V C tak es preferred stock. E and VC sim ply ente r into a ··pooling
agree ment ," contracting in th e ir capacity as sha rehold e rs with r espect
to th ei r futur e vote s. In th e co ntext of the CTM . th ey wo uld execute a
votin g agreement pu rs uant to which the occurre nce o f s sign aling an 8"
state vvo ulcl trigger th e ex te nsion of a co ntin ge nt irrevoca bl e proxy
from E to VC. Th e proxy would gi ve VC th e votes to e lect a majority
of th e board and to remov e incum ben t dir ectors. W ith bo ardroom
contro L VC ca n choose the CE O who will choose cr"'8,/11
60 . See D ewat ripont & Tirol e . supra no te 5:S. A lth ough s till a mo d e l den omi nate d as a
d eb t-equit y mode l, it no ne th e less cap tures the dy na mi c of a boa rdroo m co ntro l tra nsfe r.
This is a noth er two-pe ri o d co ntingent co ntro l m o d <e l. U nli ke th<e Agh ion- Bolto n model. thi s
one inc ludes outs id e debt a nd outside e quity in teres ts. H e re . a t 1 = 0. ou tsid e fin a ncing and
ince ntive compe nsation arra ngements a re wo rk e d o ut and manage m e nt chooses an effo rt
level e. The le ve l of e will be e ither hi g h o r lo w. wi th hi g h e producing hi g her returns in lat e r
pe ri ods but res ultin g in the incurre nce o f a utilit y cos t U to th e man age rs. At 1 = l th e fim1
reports its first pe riod profit. npl, a ve rifiable a m o unt th a t is determin e d by e. bu t which is
not a sufficient sta ti stic for e. In additi o n. a signa l s is reali ze d at thi s point. The dis tributi o n
o f signa l s al so is de te rmine d by e, and s is a s uffic ie nt s ta ti s ti c tor th e profit to be rea li ze d at 1
= 2, np2. But s is noncontrac tibl e a nd man age me nt compe nsation acco rding ly ca nnot be
made directly con tingent on it.
Thi s mod e l's distin gui shing ass umption is that the firm's capital structure accord s
cl ecisio nmakin g powe r to e ithe r th e o uts id e d ebt h o ld e r o r the outs ide equi ty ho ld e r at a
critica l mo me nt. More s pecifica ll y. imm e diate ly a ft e r 1 = I. th e o u t> id e ho lder acco rded thi s
control po wer takes a ction a. which can e ither be acqu iescence a nd co nti nua nce C in present
manage ment ope rations o r stoppag e 5 of man age ment 's co ntinued p ursuit of its business
plan. S to ppage 5 ca n e ntail a n y numbe r of subseq ue nt ac tion s. in cludin g liquid n ti o n, sale of
a divi s io n or ot he r do wns iz ing . or re direc ti o n of in ves tm e nt po licy. What eve r the acti o n
tak e n . fo r a n y give n signa l s. S e n ta il s le ss ri sky subseq ue nt ma n age me nt than C. th e
probab ility di stribution of which has fatte r uppe r a nd lower tails. At r = 2. np2 is rea lized and
inc ome is share d in accord a nce with th e co ntracts in the cap ital stru cture. /d. at I ()3 1-34.
In ves tment.
Co ntract

t=0

Reali zat io n of n p l
and sig nal s

R e alization o f np2

Ac tion a take n
t = I
Choice
t = 2
ofe
Th e mod e l exa mines two poss ibl e compe nsation in ce nti ve sc he mes fo r E: o ne
constitut e d of pri va te benefits o nl y and th e other in cludin g a sa la ry. The p urpose o f a ny s uc h
sch e me is of co ur se to indu ce E to choose a hi g h level e. But give n the m o del. and in
particu la r th e no nco ntractibi li ty of s. the o ptim al a rran gem e nt mu st inc luc\e a poss ibility of
punishm e nt in th e form o f a co ntro l tran s fer to o uts id e rs who h ave th e po we r to c hoose
acti o n 5 . Since ma nagem e nt a lways prefe rs C to S (w het her o r not C is e fficient ). a structure
that in cre ases th e possibilit y o f such inte rvention as npl and s declin e le nds man age ment an
ince ntive to ch oose a hi g h leve l of e. m a ximizing th e poss ibility of a c ho ice of C d e spite the
cos t of U th e re by incurre d. G ive n thi s. a ny bo nu s pa yme nt s should be base d o n e arnings
resul ts of both np l a nclnp2. with th e np2 target leve l ri sin g as th e npl a m o unt de clines. It!. a t
1035-39 .
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T he two different me th ods of con trol transfer, in the boardroom
and through liq uid ation, are suited to d iffe rent business outcomes.
On e acco rdingly would expect to see both employed in real world
arrange ments. Significantly , the CTM interpolates only two business
situat ions - the selection of a fr om the range A in e~ and e, states. In
practice, there will be an open-ended range of such fut ure choices: a
fr om A, b from B, c from C, and so on, and e, and e" will cover a ra nge
of outcomes. When such a choice concerns a change in the business
plan o r the replace ment of key personnel, whe ther in an e. or e~ state,
the boardroom control tra nsfer mode is indicated. The, liquidat ion
trigger, in contrast, is bet ter s uited to se vere e, states ca lli ng for
cli sinvest ment. 111
Another distinction be tw een contro l transfer by rede mpti on and
bankruptcy a nd contro l transfer by boardroom elect io n shou ld be
noted. T he form e r mode of transfer impli es VC fin a ncin g by a senior
securi ty, whether de bt or preferred. That is because when redemptio n
causes insolvency, control devolves to VC beca use it hold s a
liq uid ati on preference over E in the bankruptcy distribution.
Boardroom control transfer can be (and often is) effected in a firm
fund ed entirely with common stock and does no t implica te an
inso lve ncy proceeding. This implies a real world preference for
transfer by boardroom control transfer provisions over control
transfer through redemption and liquidation if only because
bankruptcy is costly in the real world. 62 But the prediction must be
qualified because redemption does not necessa rily lead to a
bankruptcy proceeding. If the going concern re tains value, the
trigge ring of th e redemption right can become th e occasion fo r
renegotiation between VC and £. Since VC now has the option of
forcing insolvency , it comes to the table with cognizable bargaining
power. 63
2.

Debt, Preferred, or Common?

The foregoin g discussion gives rise to two furth er questions a bout
venture capital contracts: Why preferred stock and no t debt ? A nd,
why preferred and not common stock? To ask the former question is
to note that th e periodic payment properties of noncumulative
conver tible preferred can be mimicked in part with a conve rtible

6 1. Fo r a mod el amplifying th e efficie ncy prope rti es of creditors' li quida tion rights. see
O li ver Han & John Moo re, D efaulr and Renegorimion: A Dynamic Model of Dehr. 11 3 Q .J.
ECON. 1 ( 1998).
62. See supra tex t accompanying note 59.
63 . If the going conce rn retains more value still, E ca n refinance and pay off VC. If VC
is th e pa rty position ed to choose a* th e result is suboptimal.
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income bond . '~ Such a security would import the same high -powe red
incentives to E as does convertible preferred. \Vhere the pre fe rred
hold er gets an interme diate term right to put th e stock ba ck to the
iss uer, the conve rtible bondholder gets the substance of that right ·with
interme diate term maturity. E ither way, VC gets a liquid ation
preference tha t has the effect of raising the cost to E of poo r
oer fo rmance. 65 Packaging t his convertible senior security as clc: bt
~vou ld carry two additional benefits for VC: a hig her and harder
bankruptcy priority and a chance for a tax deduction on int t r<:~:o t
payments. oo
But A merican co rporate la\v holds out a significa nt disincenti ve io
the pack aging of ve nture capital participation as cle ht. VCs commo nly
do more than mo nitor th eir investments and fac ilitate the hiring ot
proCessional managers by their portfolio companies; th ey oftr::n co m rol
or influence the decision to rep lace the CEO and ma ke othe r key
business decisions.67 To the extent that the transact ion struct ure holds
out the pros pect of significant VC input in management, incl uding the
power to specify business res ults , VC should act in the capacity of an
equity securityholder at the time it exercises such control power. A
deb tholder who exercises control power in that capacity loses its
limited liability status, and could be personally liable to other creditors
of the firm or even to E in the event its manageme nt decisions wo rk
out b a d ly . 6~ D e btholders can influence control while retaining limited
liability only indirectly, by specifying default events ex ante in negative
covenants. In order to structure meaningful control by a clebtholder,
then, a basis of contractible subj ect matter is needed. In the
alternative, a contingent control transfer to a debtholcler can be
effected without risk of unlimited lia bility on the scenario posed by the
CTM defa ult , bankruptcy, emergence with VC in charge ,
1

64. Kaplan & Stromberg. s up ra no te 12 (working paper at lS). report that pre ferred
di vide nds are cumulat ive in on ly 46 % o f the cases. This sugges ts th a t periodic inco m e is not
a prima ry co nce rn he re.
65 . Klausner & Litva k, supra note 9 (worki ng pape r at 10).
66 . For the ta x clecl uction. a firm promise to pay would be necess ary. The inco me
contingency would not strengthe n the case . See Fin Hay Realty Co. v . U nited Sta tes_ 39S
F.2d 694. 696 (3d Ci r. 196S).
67. K la usner & Li twak. supm note 9 (working pape r a t 4-5) .
6S. T he class ic case. Ma r tin v. Peyton . 158 N .E. 77 (N.Y. 1927 j . con<.:erm a loan to a
partn<::rs hip. The li a bility of bank lt:ncle rs to small b usinesses is th e sub ject of le ading cases in
recen t yea rs . S ee . e.g. . K. M.C. Co .. lnc. v_ Irving T ru st Co ., 757 F.2cl 752 (6th Cir. 1~S5 ): State
Nat 'l Bank of E l Paso v_ Fa rah Mfg. Co .. 678 S.W.2cl 661 (Tex. A p p 1984) . S ec ge nem!/1
Margaret Ham brecht Do uglas-Ha milt on . Creditor Liabi!irit>s R esulting _ti-om Improper
fnt erfi:rence 1vith the Managem el!l of u Finuncia/lv Troubled Dehtor_ 31 BLiS. LA W. 3--13
(i 975). The r<:: is of course a way to deflect t his ri sk to r a deb t hol ding VC with con t ro l power.
If the VC is a hum a n bei ng, one form s a wholly owned shell corpo ration o r limi ted liabi lity
compa ny to hold th e debt: if the VC is a corpora ti o n, it fo rm s a she ll wh o ll y o wned
subsidi ary. Both steps are cos tly . and th ere remains a resi dual ri sk of veil pie rci ng.
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presumably as the holder of all of the equity of a reorganized firm. But
as noted above, bankruptcy costs make this a second-best alternative
in real world planning.
The preferred/common stock choice turns in part on priorities. In
the CTM, E takes periodic return in salary t. If VC takes its position in
common stock and E also holds some common as an incentive device ,
VC and E would share what is left of rat r = 2 pro rata, which would
mean a double clip for E. If VC holds stock with an income preference,
VC takes r-t, to the extent of the preference and any common stock
held by E would pay in addition to t only to the extent that VC's
preference is satisfied fully. More generally , in small business
planning, preferred and d ebt are standard tools for compensating
financial participants where the entrepreneurs take much of their
share of free cash flows in the form of salary payments.m In addition,
on downside scenarios preferred means a priority to whatever is left in
liquidation. 7° Finally, there is an exogenous regulatory concern.
Regulated institutional investors participating in the venture capital
partnership, such as insurance companies, will prefer to take their
equity in the form of convertible senior securities so as to satisfy legal
constraints on the amount of common stock in their investment
portfolios. 71

3.

Shored Control

We turn now to the CTM's assumption that even though o* cannot
be specified in advance, the parties can, to the extent they deem s
reliable, contract ex ante to change control for the purpose of making
the selection of a* more likely. This setup is descriptive of
innumerable instances in practice. Financial contracts routinely utilize
such imperfect but verifiable signals. Such real world manifestations of
s are the accounting and performance data utilized in the drafting of
representations, closing conditions, covenants, and default triggers.
69. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT E. THOMPSON. O'NEAL'S CLOSt: CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE ~ 2.21 (3d eel. 1998). Sahlman. supra note 21. at 510. suggests an
additional tax reason. The overhang of preferred rights lowers the value of the common for
tax purposes. permitting E to buy the common stock at low prices without reporting taxable
income on the differential between the amount paid and the greater amount paid by VC. See
also Klausner & Litvak. supra note 9 (working paper at 9).
70. One could presumably replicate the preferred stock outcome by placing in VC a
combination of common stock and debt. This would. however. mean a process burden on
VC in the event of exercise of control to make it clear that it acted in the capacity of a
common stockholder. A residual litigation risk would endure even so.
71. Incidence of insurance company participation in venture capital firms varies from
year to year. PAUL A. GOiv!PERS & JOSH LERNER. THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 8-9
tbl.l.l (1999). shows that insurance company and bank participation levels in venture capital
partnerships amounted to l6'1o in 1978. 15°/r, in 1987. and 18% in 1995. but 4% inl979. 6%
in !991 and I% in 1997. Public and private pension funds consistently arc the largest
investors. putting in 40% of the capital in 1997.
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Indeed , 15 % of the cases in Kaplan and Stromberg's sa mple specify
boardroom con trol tr a nsfers to VC ba sed on a financi a l or
performances.
More diffi cult contracting problems arise wh ere governance
interve ntion needs to be specified but s is unre liable , unverifiable, or
there is no s. lf we stay within the confin es of the CTM, the lack of s
mea ns that noth ing exists to tri gger a transfe r of control and V C has to
le t the in ves tme nt ride until l =2 . At th at point , given a 8" sta te, VC's
dividend and liquidation priorities assu me paramo unt importance, but
the payoff may be suboptimal.
Le t us abandon the CTM's ha rd ass umptio ns respecting payo uts to
E and VC and the choice of action a. 7" and in stead ass ume that th e
choice among a" and a,, on ec and 8" sta tes depends on complex and
probabilistic factors so that th e re is no clea r cut connecti on betwee n £
or VC control and the optimal choice of a. Although it always is
optimal in th e model to leave E in charge on 8~ states, now it is
plausible to suggest that VC co uld effect a *8~ simply by removi ng E
and undertaking a searc h for a substitute chief executive better suited
to grappling with the problems at hand and bringing about a*. But
because the decision that a substitute is better fitted to effect a*8g
follows from a complex business judgmen t, there may be no b asis with
which to provid e for this control alloca tion ex ante. The same sort of
proble m could arise in an 8" state where correction re mains possible,
with the new CE O being charged with the job of turning the operation
around. Such scenarios are be tter suited to treatment through the
operation of a contractually institute d governance process than
through adva nce contractual specification of a clear-cut outcome.
Joint control suggests itself as a solution in th ese cases.73 In Aghion
and Bolton's CTM, joint control is defin e d very narrowly to m ean that
either E and VC both agree, or that in the eve nt of disagreement , E
will m ake a one-time, take-it-or-leave-it offer to VC as to choice of a;
in the event that VC refuses the offer, dea dlock results and the returns
to both parties are zero. Such a joint control set up m eans tha t hole!
ups are a possibility in every case. As a result, in Aghion and Bolton 's
model , joint control always is dominated by unilateral or contingent
control. 74

72. That is. th at yiJp, < yB,.a, and th at hfJ,a, < biJ,a,.
73. For a form<JI model o f joi nt contro l in venture ca pital contexts in wh ich con tr ol is a
continu ous va ria ble to be adj uste d thro ugh diffe re nt co ntract provisions. sec And re i A.
Kirilenko. Va!u111i on and Con1ro/ in Ve111ure Fin ance. 56 J. FIN. 565 (2001). This model. by
opening up control to a ran ge . move s th e form al theory of the firm close r to Kap la n and
Strombe rg's real-world picture . lt does not however. specify any direct conn ec ti o ns between
its form a l te rm s a nd rea l wo rld instituti o ns.
74. Ag hion & Bolton. supra note 13. a t 486.
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But joint control is not dominated if we change the CTM's
assumptions. Contingent control dominates only because the model
assumes a reliable s. Vvithout a reliable s, the negotiating parties would
have a high-powered incentive to find a way to contract around the
deadlock the model assumes. It comes as no surprise that any number
of such devices show up in real world business planning practice. For
example, VC could contract for a seat on the board of directors. 75 This
ameliorates information asymmetries and irnports voice without the
power to direct results - VC can attempt to intluence E without
having a power to specify the choice of a. Alternatively, the parties
could contract for fift y- fifty boardroom representation and interpolate
a deadlock breaker, such as arbitration. Since this would be contingent
on their failure to agree, it wo uld not depend on the identification of
an s. Such sharing arrangements are common in the world of contracts
among equity par ticip an ts in small businesscs. 76 Although not perfect,
such so lutions do amount to a plausible second best given the absence
of a contractible contingency clearly indicating that control should be
vested in E or VC.
With this we return to Ka plan and Stromberg's results and the
practice of shared control in venture capital startups. 77 The contracting
pattern suggests an interesting modification of the CTM's setup. As
noted, contracts providing for contingent control transfer to the VC
upon an s specified in advance are a minority. But this point also
confirms the theoretical prediction that contracts in this context will
manifest strategies for dealing with noncontractible subject matter. 78
The small number of such provisions bespeaks a judgment that the
availab le signals are unreliable. It appears that both VC and E prefer
to grapple with unverifiable facts attending eh states in the black box
of the boardroom.

75. Venture capital transactions include a separate "Investor Rights Agreement"
entered into between the issuer and individual purchasers of preferred. These contracts
customarily include a right to attend board meetings in a nonvoting capacity. Sec Craig E.
Dauchy, Venture Capital Financings, in DOING DEALS 2000: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS
AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 233 , 301 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac .. Course
Handbook Series No. 1167,2000).
76. O'NEAL & THOMPSON. supra note 69,

at~§

9.0-.38.

77. For a contrasting discussion of shared control arrangements. see Armando Gomes &
Walter Novaes. Sharing of Conrro! as a Corpomte Governance Mechanism (SSRN Elec.
Paper Coli. No. 277111. 2001). ar http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=277lll. Gomes and Novaes
model shared control as a governance mechanism for a firm with a dispersed minority
shareholder interest. They hypothesize two blockholders who together control management
decisions but cannot act unilaterally, and they show that in some circumstances such an
arrangement could be superior to either of control by a single blockholder or widely
dispersed shareholding.
78. The practitioner literature shows that this is effected by a shareholder voting
agreement pursuant to which. in the event that performance targets are not met. E promises
to vote for additional directors nominated by VC. Dauchy. supra note 75. at 243.
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During the noncontractible period between t = 0 and r = 2, ·ve,
instead of waiting for a ve ri fiable signal, takes a noncontrolling
position inside the firm's boardroom. In the bo ardro om there are
three directors, E. V C, and a ne utral third actor selecte d by both . So
long as the three agree, control is shared. In the event of disagreement
be tween VC and £ , the mutually se lected th ird director holds the
balance of power. By hypothesis, VC and E will compete to influence
th e third director. Sup pose perform a nce has been mediocre and VC
would like to re move and replace E as CEO. If the thi rd director is
mo tivated to e nh ance firm value and VC persuades the third directo r
that the move is necessa ry fo r ac hieve ment of a n 8,. state, E is ou t. A t
the same time, E a ls o has access to the third direc-t or and can state a
defense. 79
Compare the more lim ited menu of con tro l transfer devices in the
CTM. T here, if no transfe r o ccurs by advance specification but
pe rformance incentives turn o ut to be dysfun ctio nal, you contract into
the optimal performance state only by means of a Coasia n bribe .
Interestingly, this item is always on the reai wo rld menu. Nothing
stops a VC in the tripa rtite shared-control arrangement from making a
similar bribe either to the third director or to E. Nor does any thing
stop the third director from initiating this discussion and holding out
for a side payment. B ut a persuasive substantive pitch to the third
director costs VC less than a bribe. By hypo thesis, then, the ideal third
director has a stron g reputational interest in being seen as an
impartial, expert maker of good-faith business judgments who pursues
firm value from a neut ral stance and is impervious to Co asian bribes.
This lets the firm reach a* without barriers stemming from ex ante
wealth endowments or insufficient expected value of the projec t in e,,.
For the reputational constraint to work, the third director would have
to be an actor known in a business community common to both E and
V C. Here, as in G ilson and Black's description, th e real world patte rn
of close geographic proximity betwee n E a nd VC wo uld be facilitative:
the third director should also live in the neigh borhood. Similar
reputational concerns m ay constrain the VC before forming an
alliance with the third director against E. The VC wh o engineers too
many E replacements or, worse , abuses its power, can be shut out of
future deals with the best £s _xo

79 . For a com pariso n ve nture ca pital form, which provides for VC control on a three out
of five basis, see 1 M ICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL.. VE NTU RE CAPITA L AN D PUB LI C
O FFE RI NG NEGOTIAT ION§ 8-23 (3d eeL 2000).
80. Black & Gilso n. sup ra no te 17 , at 262-63: Sa hlman. supra note 7. at 513; see also
Kirilenk o. supra note 73 . at 570 (noting th a t ·' ve nture ca pital firms a re grea tl y di ffe re ntiated
by reput ation' ').
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Implication s

T he shared control structure's real world dominance over the
alternative of VC control or hard wired control transfers suggests that
Es have significant but not decisive barga inin g powe r, pres um ably
because VCs compete to fin ance the most promising e ntre pre ne urs. It
also suggests th at an arra ngem e nt positioning coopera tion in the
shadow of a threatened control transfe r h as productivity advantages.
Certainly. there is evidence of significant CEO turnover in the venture
capit a l fi e lcl. 81 Thus , to the extent th e ve nture ca pi ta l in teres t can be
protected satis factoril y without outright boardroom co nt ro l, one
wo uld expect shared control to dominate over ve nture ca pit alist
co ntrol.
A rece nt story in th e busin ess press re inforces this description of
share d contro l in venture cap it al portfo lio co mpanies. R obert E.
D avo li, a VC wit h a notabl e num be r of wildly successful high
technology inves tments in the years preceding 2000, a lso is known for
an aggressive posture respecting the te nure of his £s. H e has fired six
of twenty-four in a five-year period . The result is a reputation as an
impatient VC, in contrast to the more passive postures of the " instant"
VCs who , chasing the trend , entered the business in the late 1990s.
This is said to make Davoli a throw back to the heroic clays of venture
capital in the 1960s, when pionee rs like Arthur Rock and Thomas J .
Perkins took a hands-on role. M eanwhile , Davoli is said to be subject
to a constraint when attacking an E for missing a performance targe t.
He must first mobilize the board. x2
Even as this story describes a world of shared contro l, it suggests
cau tion with the foregoing acco unt. First , venture capital
arrangements may have evolved in hi story, with VC control being the
prac tice in an early phase and shared control becoming more
prominent as more capital came to pursue fewer deals with a more
sophistica ted gen eration of Es. Second , share d control m ay m ean
diffe rent things in different portfolio companies. Many factors can
come to bear when the third director is se lected . VC is likely to have

Sl. GOMPERS & L ERNER. supra note 7 1. at 176-78, repo rts turnover in 40 o ut of 220
ven ture capi tal rounds in their da ta se t. M.T. H annan et a l.. Jnerlia and Change in !he Ea rly
Y ears: Employment Relarions in Young, High Technology Firms , 5 INDUS . & COR P.
CHANG E 503 (1996) , finds that in th e first twenty month s following a firm 's initi al round of
ve nture capi ta l finance, 20% of firm s replace E with a non fo under C E O : th e percentage
goes up to 40% afte r fo rty m onths and SO% after e ighty month s. Se e also Klausner & Litvak.
supra no te 9 (wo rkin g paper a t 6) .
82 . J ohn A. Byrn e, How a VC Does !1 . Bus. WK .. Ju ly 24, 2000. at 97. More ge nera lly.
" high-repu tatio n VCs te nd to replace CEOs m o re ofte n th an low-rep ut a ti o n VCs do."
Klau sne r & Litvak. supm not e 9 (working paper at 6). F o r a di scus sion of the problem s a n E
fac es in ch oosing a VC and a description of a rep utati ona l market for VC services. see D.
Gordon S mith. Ve mure Capiral Conlracring in rh e l nformarion Age. 2 J. SMALL &
EM ERGING Bus. L. 133 (1998).
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the mo re exte nsive ne twork of potenti al candidates . Information
asymmetri es and differentia ls in bargaining pmve r and skill could
me a n that the ''indepe ndent" ' third directo r is highly susceptible to the
influence of th e V C (or, as seems less like ly. to the influen ce o f £). If
ne ::-:>ooti a tions work svstematicall v to fa vo r VC intlu ence, the re a l world
of shared control may not be mat eri ally di ssimilar from that of the
standard picture o f VC co ntrol.
Consid er in thi s rega rd a technical poin t res pecting the contro l
sharing mecha nism. A s a matt e r of contrac t p la nnin g, it is never
e no ugh forE and V C to agree to agre e on th e third dire ctor. One must
a lso provide for the possibility that E and VC mi ght fail to agree on a
c anclid a te. 8 ~ W ith o ut a deadlock-brea kin g a rr ~m gc m en t a t th e selection
stage. a boa rd o f two can e merge and make costly deadlock a
poss ibility. T he standard close co rpo ration dra fting solution is to
provid e for th e intervention ol a ne ut ra l ar bitrat o r at this point. 84 The
legal litera ture suggests th at a lo w-cost but somewhat arbitrary
a lte rnative approach is utilized in some venture capital deals. Unde r
this, the charter provides that E's class of stock el ects one director,
VCs class of stock elects one director, and th e third director is elected
by all the stock, voting as a single class. ~'' A ssuming that E and VC
each have one vote pe r share and do not h o ld exactly the same
number of shares, the result in a case of disagreement is that the
winning third-seat candidate will be nominated by the actor with the
larger absolute number of shares. Absent som e other arrangement
constraining the exercise of voting power, this means that in the event
of disagre em e nt , the party with th e share voting majority controls all
significant firm decisions. According to Kapl an and Stromberg's
numbe rs, this contracting solution favors the VC in th e majority of
cases.
W e have assayed th e dynamics of shared control without asking a
fundamental que stion: Why have shared control in most cases, full V C
control in a significant minority of cases . and full E control in a smaller
minority of cases ? What factors disting uish the thre e classes of
transactions? On a standard agency cost analysis we should expect to
see greate r control rights in VC in transactions holding out greater
information asymmetries and a dverse selection problems.x6 A line of
J

-

tl3 . O ne also needs to control th e size of the board. Th e prac titio ner litera ture contains
an exe mplar o f a VC. E vo ting agreeme nt con ta ining a provision requiring unanimous
consent to increase th e size o f the board. Lawre nce B. Low, Venture Capiwl Agreements. in
NUTS AND BOLTS OF FI NANCIAL PRODUCTS: UNDE RSTAND ING TH E EVO LVING WOR LD OF
CAPITA L MARK ET AN D INVESTMENT MANAGEM ENT PRO DUCTS 31 3. 413 (PLI Corp. L. &
Prac.. Course Handbook Se ri es No. 1035 . 199R) .
R4 . See Ringling Bros.-B a rnum & Ba iley Combined Sho ws v. Ringling. 53 A.2d 441
(D el. 1947): O' NEA L & TH OiviPSO N. supra note 69. at§ § 9.0-.38.

85 . Dauchy. supra note 75 . at 316.
86 . Malcom P. Bake r & Paul A. G o mpe rs. Execwi ve 0 1vnership and Com ro l in Newlv
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theo retical economics expands on this poin t m d eta il. Thomas
I-Iellrna n focuses on ba rga ining powe r and produ ctivity variables. He
::1sks why E \voulcl surrend er control in the firs t place, since surrender
of control creates the possibility that at some poi nt after startup VC
\vill term inate E as CFO and substitute a professiona l man ager.P H
\/C always has all the bargain ing power , the question is easily
cn!S\Vered - E has no other way to access cap itaL But, notes Hellman.
a puzzle arises in a wo rld where Es can access al tema tive (a nd more
pT:;sive) so urces of capital. Alternalively, an E with a n attr8.ct ive!ooking project acquires ba rgain ing power when multiple VCs
compete [or the op portunity to participate . In :H el lman's mod e l. VC
con tro l is rnore likely, and re place inent of E more fre quent , where
profess io nal rn anage rTlent substitutes add value . Es tend to be
unpn, d uct ive , Es de rive lo w p rivate benefits from contro l, and VC;
have greater bargaining power. ~ 0 In th e alternative. Kir ile nko offers an
incomple te contracts mode l which shows that more con trol comes to
VC with higher degre es of adverse selection. In this mod e l, as control
is surrendered to VC, E can be expected to take a giVe back in the
form of more adva n tageo us fi nancial t erm s . ~N

II .

TH E P REFERRE D STOC K P R OBLEM I N T HE VENTURE CAPITAL
CONTEXT

The theore tical case for preferre d stock as a financing vehicle for
venture capital, thus descri bed, is robust. B ut problems inhere in the
legal fra mework that encases preferred stock. This Part d escribes
those problems and the con tractu al solutions that have evolved in the
vent ure capital context. \Vhen we eme rge from this discussion , venture
ca pit al preferred will still be in a robust co nditio n. B ut it will have a
few weaknesses in need of attentio n .

i'-L

The Prefe rred Stock Problem

T he "preferred stock problem " is wro ugh t into the historical
perform ance of publicly traded preferred . T he cl assic description of
the prob lem can be foun d in G raham and Dodd's tre ati se on
corporate finance . Graha m and Dodd warned value inves tors agains t
investment in preferred stock, observing that it did not behave like a
senior security should on all downside scenarios. T h e di viden d

Pu hlic Finns. The Role of Venture Cupillllists (SS R N Elec. Paper Cull. No. ln5173. 19YY) . 111
h ttp:/ipapc rs.ssrn.com/a bstract =l n5173.
~n .

Hellman. supm note 13, at 58.

S8. /d . a t 60.
;~lJ.

Kirilc n ko . supm nok 73. at 579-80.
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preference worked well in good times; the liquidatio n preference
maintained senior status [n extreme distress situ atio ns. T he problem
Jay in the mi dd le , with the issuer who found itself struggling to gain or
maintain a position in a hostile product market. T he struggling issuer
co uld cut off periodic payments to the preferred indefinit ely, putting it
in the position of a residual interest holder, even as the iss uer kept
current its interest and principa l payments on subordin ated debt.
Avoidance ot a ba nkruptcy filin g gave the issuer a powerful incentive
to maintain the cash flows on the debt. 911 It had no comparab le
ince ntive to keep current on the preferred. Contractual provisi o n for
the cumul ation of missed preferred divid ends did no t correct th e
incentive probl em. As between al locating a doll a r to a prei'erred
dividend or enhan cing the business plan, the struggiing issue r ahvays
chose the latter. A n overhang of preferred dividend arrcaragcs could
be dealt with later, after a turna round in the p roduct market. Often
that turnaround never happened.
Even the preferred of the most highly rated issuers failed to pass
inspection in Graham and Dodd 's risk-averse framework. Highly rated
preferred , they said , offered only the slightest step up in yield over
comparable subordinated debt. This did not adequately compensate
for the contractual risks. 91 The preferred stock form, Graham and
Dodd concluded , was "fundamentally unsatisfactory. " ~ Anticipating
the CTM, they opined that preferred made sense 011ly under a
contract providing that suspension of the payment stream triggere d a
transfer to the preferred of voting control over the firm. But they
entered a caveat he re too. Even if the contract provided for voting
control, it was not safe to assume that it would be ·'intelLigently
utilized" 93 by a dispersed group of small holders.
Graham and Dodd's negative analysis has proved predictive.
Usage of preferred as a mode of finance by mature firms declined
markedly in the latter part of the twentieth century. Pu blicly issued
preferred persists in substantial volume only in the capital structures
of firms in regulated industrie s, such as banks and public utilities. For
these firms, preferred issues make cost sense as a means of satisfying
regulatory mandates to increase the base of eq uity capital. 94
Opinions nonetheless will differ as to whether Graham and Dodd 's
blanket disapproval should be taken seriously tod ay. Their depression9

90. BENJf\tviiN G RA H A M ET AL.. SECU RITY ANAL YSJ S: PR I NCII'AL.S AND T EC H N IQUE
379 (4th eel. 1962).
9 1.

!d. at 382 : see uiso

AN~\ LY S IS

SIDNEY CO"IT L E ET AL.. GRAHAi\,1 A ND O O D D·s SE CURITY

470-74 (5th cd. 1988) .

92. GRAHA!vl ET AL. supru no te 90, a t 375,
93. !d. at 381.

94 .

RI CH A RD

A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

FI NANCE 392-93 (6th eel. 2000).
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e ra risk ave rsion rin gs hollow in the contex t of th e risk neutralit y of
m odern financial economics. Sure ly, says the conte mporary observer.
actors in the ca pita l marke ts will have devised so lutions to any
contracting prob lems. Th e contemporary prefer ence for sub ordinated
debt ove r prefe rre d shou ld be a ttributed to th e tax system and the
age nc y cost adva ntages o f debt capitali zat ion 95 rat he r than to an y
intri ns ic infirmity in th e preferred stock fo rm .')6 Int e res t paym ents are
deduct ible by th e iss uer wh ere preferred dividend payme nts arc not,
making debentures the cheaper m ode of Cinancin g for iss ue rs with
substa ntia l in co me tax li ab ilities 97 - so much chea per th a t th e cost
ba lance tends to tip only in the case of reg ulated iss ue rs.
Obse rvers schooled in corporate law will be less quick to discard
Graham <md Dodd's nega tive judgmen t on th e preferred stock
contrac t. The lega l track record of publi cly issu ed preferred , vie wed
from th e inves tor's point o f view, has been as dis mal as was th e
fin ancia l performance ot pub lic utili ty preferred iss ues l1l the
de pression era .')o To a reade r of case law on preferred stock contrac ts ,
Graham and Dodd got it exactly right: absent voting contro l a nd a
m eans o f sur mou ntin g collective action problems in its exe rc1se,

Y5 . Michael C. J e nse n. !lgency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Co rporate Finun cl.', and
Tak eovers. 76 AM ER. ECO N. RE V. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1Y86).

%. C( Robe rt H e inke l & J ose f Zechn e r. Th e R ole of D ebt and Pre(erred Swck as a
Solution tu Adverse Investmen t Incentives. 25 J . F IN. & QUA NT. ANAL. 1 ( 1990) (s howi ng
that preferred creates ince nti ves for the firm 's commo n ho lde rs to in vest. a nd thus
ameliorates the und e rinvestment problem that foll ows from th e iss uance o f debt: a new iss ue
of preferre d n1unt c rs th e agency costs of debt. and th ere by not only e nhances th e firm' s de bt
capacity hut in c reases the ove ra ll va lue o f the firm ).
Y7. VICTOR BRUDNEY & W ILLI Ai'vl W. BRATI'O N. BRU DNE Y & C HIR.ELSTE IN'S CASES
AND M .-\TER IALS ON COR PORATE F INANC E 337-38 (4 th e el. 1993). So m e of thi s re la ti ve
di sa d va ntage is mack up by th e intercorporate divide nd e xclu sion. under whi ch corpora te
ho ld ers o f prefe rred can e xclude a subs tantial percentage of divid ends rece iv ed from the ir
co rpora te tax ba ses. I.R. C. ~~ 243. 244 ( lYYO). The res ult is that prefe rred. particu larly if
issued by <l hi g h-gra de publi c utilit y, ca n offer a n a ttractive oppo rtunit y to in s urance
co m pa ni es a nd ot her co rpora te ins tituti o na l in ves tors. The lax be ne fit m ea ns a lower y ie ld
a nd cos t of cap it a l to th e iss uer. Dona ld E. Fisc he r & Glen n A. Wi lt , No n- Convertible
Preferred Stuck os o Financing !n strttment 1950-/965. 23 J. F IN. 6ll (196o). Sho rt-t e rm
fl oating ra te prefer red with divid e nd rates tied to short-te rm int erest rates a lso m akes use of
the inte rcorporate cliviclencl exclus io n. T his paper is o ften issu ed by banks and so ld to
corporatio ns with excess cash ava il ab le for short-te rm investme nt , fo r wh ich it makes an
attrac tive alte rnati ve to s hort-term d e bt in strum e nt s.
A no th er tax d odge al so mus t be no te d. In th e mi cl- 1990s. in ves tm e nt banke rs put th e
corporate trust d ev ice to use in inv e nting tax d e ductible prefe rred. Here th e corporatio n
r a isin g the capital iss ues bonds to a spec ial purp ose tru st. The trust in turn raises the capital
to pay fo r the bonds by iss uin g pre ferred stock to co rpo rate tax payers . T he ultim a te c re dit
on the deal tak es an int e rest d ed uction while th e ultimate sources o f capital get th e
inte rco r po ra te divid e nd exc lusio n. By the e nd of 1997 . more than 285 o f these iss ues we re
o ut standin g: th ey had ra ise d $27 bi lli o n. A run Kh a nn a & John J. McCo nn e lL J\1/Ps, QUIPs
AND TOPrs: Old Wine in Nnv Soules. 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FI N. 39 (1998).
98 . See Rob ert M. Bla ir-Smi th & L e onard H e lfens tein. A D ea th Sentence or u New
Leuse on Life? A Su rvey of Corporate Adjustm ents under th e Public Utili ty Holding
Company Act. 9-'1 U. PA . L. RE V. 148. 150-51. 162-69 (1946 ).
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preferred holde rs are vulnerable to issuer opportunism. In bad times,
they are the victims of opportunistic recapitalizations and on e-sided
renegotiations pursuant to which their pre fere nce rights are strip ped
.
.
for th e beneftt of the common stoc k. In good ttmes, contract ual
legerdema in incident to mergers and acquisition s can lead to th e same
results. again transferring value from th eir pockets to those of the
common stockholders.
Furthermore. preferred's lega l position de teriorated markedly
over the course of the twentieth century. Prio r to ! 940, some of these
opportunistic transactions were held by state cour ts to violate
cons titutional property rights. But that ··vested rights'' th eory of
judicial protection fell out of favor. This can he attributed in part to
the ascendency of re alist and collectivist jurispmdcn ce during the New
Deal. 1uo Charter competition also p layed a rok. Delaware has seen
that the interes ts of the managers who choose states o f incorporat ion
are aligned with the common stockholders agai nst prefe rred and other
senior security holders and shaped its case law accordingly. 101 Today's
cases hold out no fiduciary or other protective doctrine to substitute
for the defunct vested rights approach. As a result , public preferred
holders h ave to rely on the literal terms of their contracts to protect
against issuer opportunism. From the evidence of the litigated cases,
the contracts never evolved so as to close all the loopholes and
provide reliable protection. 102
From the legal perspective, the n, the eclipse of preferred as a
financing vehicle for mature firms may reflect dysfunctional
contracting in addition to tax disadvantages . Under this view, it is not
safe to assume that the legal framework encasing a given mode of
~

~

')9 . It should be noted that a surrende r of ri g hts by a c lass of pre fer red in co nnec tion
wi th a di s tre sse d iss uer" s recapita lization is not per se unfair. Sometimes the commo n stock
has rights to o. as where both the preferred a nd the common have to vote as a cl ass to
approve a charter a me ndme nt or merge r that will mak e th e firm as a whole more va lu able.
In such a case. the commo n will not suppor t th e tr ans ac tion unl ess it is allocated a part of th e
proceeds. R es ponsible managers do the ir bes t to g ive th e common en o ugh to garne r its
s upport but otherwise respect the rights of the prefern:cl. The c la ssic case is G old111an v.
Postal Telegraph, Inc.. 52 F. Supp. 763 (D . D e l. 1943 ).

100. See Davi son v. Parke , Aus tin & Lipscomb. 35 N.E.2d 618. 622 (N.Y. 1941):
NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CO RPORAT IONS 573-82 (2cl eel. 1971). The le gal
landscape surrounding bonds also cha nge d drastic ally during the co urse of the twentieth
ce ntury. Fiduciary dutie s to bondholders toda y are hypothe sized by law review
commentators. No significant case supports th e m. ln the 1920s. fiduciary duties to
bondholders we re eve ryday subj e ct m a tt e r in litigated cases. See. e.g , Cha rle s H. Haines, Jr. .
Comment, Corpormions - Modifi carion Provisions of Corporate ivlortgages and Trusl
!nce111ives. 38 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1939).
101. The le ading Delaware case is Federal Uni1ed Co rp. \'. f-!11\ ender. J1 A.2d 331 (De l.
1940).
102. ALFRED F. CON ARD, CORPORATIONS IN PE RSPECTIVE 266 ( 1976): Victor
Brudney, Srandards of Fairness and !he Limils of Preferred Sr ock i'vlodijicaliuns. 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973): Lawrence E. Mitchell. Tlze Pu zz ling Problem of Preferred
Stock (And Wlzy We Sh ould Care A bow II) . 51 Bus. L Aw. 443 (1996 ).
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fin ance has evolved so as to fost er firs t-best contractual risk
allocations. m> For preferred boiders, ocr
G raham and Dodd, the legal
'
~
environment makes voting control the sine qua non of adequate
protection . There resu lts a st icking point. Mature issuers will be
unwilling to concede voting co ntrol to senior security holders whose
capital contribution amo unts to a minority proportion of the firm ·s
equity base. Un less the contract is carefully drafted to vest the
preferred wi th critical vetoes, the contract can be unilateral ly
amended to remove or modify the preferred's righ ts to the benefit of
the common . "~ Preferred stock contracts drafted wit h the degre e of
precision necessary to assure 100% protection against such ex post
stripping of value have be en the exception and not th e rule . A species
of bargain ing impasse results - an impasse makin g the publicly issued
preferred of a ma ture firm unlikely to carry an advantageous price
when compared to a subordinated debenture .
The subsections that follow describe the preferred stock problem
in greater detail. T he discuss ion picks up the contracting pattern
described in Part I, distinguishing injuries that stem from the absence
of control of the boardroom from injuries that stem from the absence
of a majority of the votes at shareholders' meetings. Section B will
return to venture capital preferred to gauge the degree of success VCs
have had in solving the problems.
1

Con trol in the Boardroom

1.

Recall that in the CTM, the firm 's central governance proble m
co nce rns the allocation of the power to select a maximizing course of
action a* given suboptimal incentives on the part of the holders of the
firm 's commo n equity. In practice, whether such a critical choice
implicates investme nt policy, dividend po licy, the decision to se ll or
liquidate the fi rm, or ame ndment of the firm 's char ter, the lega lly
constituted governance structure of the corporation vests the power to
make the decision in the boardroom. In some cases, as wi th m ergers
(a nd asse t sell-o uts) , liquidations , and charter amendments, approval
of th e shareholders also must be bestowed at a second stage. B ut the
board still controls the agenda and acts as the first-stage gatekeeper.
So, to re turn to the problem described by G raham and Dodd, when an
issue of preferred loses value because it pays no dividends at a time
103. For

expositions

Srandurdi~urion

and

of

thi s

fnnovurion

view.

see

Marcel

Kahan

&

Michael

Klau s ner.

in

Co rporure Conrrucring (or '"The Econo mics n(
!Joifapfure '" ). X3 Y A . L. REv. 7 13 ( 1997). ami Micha e l K laus ner. Corpomrions. CorporaTe
Lmv, and NeMorks of Conrmcrs, ti I VA. L. REV. 757 ( 1995).

104. A promise to pay ca n be inse rt e d into the prefer red stock contrac t in addition to
divid end priority. The pro mise is n ot of the same order. howe ver, as the promise to pay debt.
Since dividends cann o t be paid wh ere debt is outstanding in distre ss situ a tions. th e promise
is inh ere ntly conditional.
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when the firm possesses free cash flow , the problem pres upposes tha t
the prefe rred lack contro l or influence in the boardroom.

o. Vuln erobi!ity: Preferred Absenr Control or Shared Control. The
facts of Eq uity- Linked Inv estors, L.P. v. Adoms, 105 the leading case
deciding a dispu te respecting preferred stock issued to a venture
capit al investor, provide a m ore particular description of the prob le m.
T his sad story starts in the portfolio company's fifth year. Called
Genta Inc .. it hac\ su ccessfull y completed st artup and go ne p ublic. At
the time ot its IPO, G enta sold a second round batch of prefe rred , $3U
million ·worth. to a group of vent ure capitalists (VC). The p refe rred
was at the we ak end o f the contract protection range - VC neither
contro lled nor shared co nt rol in the boardroom and d id not ho ld a
voting majority of th e sha re s. Jun
G enta needed th e ca pita l to u peration alize a cluster of int ell cc twll
property rights in ge netic research. Three yea rs later, in mid -1996.
not hi ng operational had come up. A second operating divisi on of the
company was at work on an application but had ye t to produce a
positive cash flow . A third division had a small biopharmaceutical
manufacturing operation with a positive cash flow. Desp ite these
efforts, Ge nta was running out of cash. Indeed, the company as a
whole had consumed $100 million over eight years withou t re turning a
doll ar. Dr. Thomas A dams (the£) was the CEO.
E was de termined to stay in control and buy more time. Since VC
had refused to invest further capital, investment bankers were hired to
scare up new financing, equity or debt. Meanwhile, VC pressured E
and his board of directors to sell off the firm 's assets and distribute the
lion 's share of the proceeds to it. E resisted. U nfortunately for VC. its
contracts gave it no rights with which to force the issue . Genta had a
ne ar-term duty to redeem the preferred, but Genta could sat isfy the
duty with either cash or common stock. Since Genta had no cash , th e
redemption had to be in stock. Genta's problem was that as the
redemption date approached , Nasdaq was initiating delisting
proceedings beca use Ge nta no longer met minimum stan da rd s.
·Mea nwhile , delisting was classified in the preferred stock contrac t as a
"fundam ent al change" tha t triggered a cash redemption right. T his put
E in a race against the clock. He had to find new fin an cing and
stabilize the firm 's cash fl ow position befor e Nasdaq deli sted th e
common stock, triggering the cash redemption. 107 Since there was no
way to fin ance a cash redemption, triggering mea nt a defensive

105. 705 A.2cl1040 (De l. Ch. 1997).
106. !d. at 1043-44.
107. !d. at 1045-52.
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bankruptcy filing to prevent th e prefe rred from executing a judgme nt
aga inst all of the asse ts o f the company. 10s
E an d Genta managed to win the race by a nose , stalling Nasd aq
by beggi ng for mo re time even as they closed a desperation financing
with a firm called Aries. run by a Dr. R ose nwald. In exch ange for a $3
milli on loa n, secured by Gen ta's assets. Ge nta gave Aries control of
the board along with a fistful of warrants and conve rsio n ri ghts that
carri ed majority vot in g co ntrol of the firm . Aries promise d to use its
best e ffo rts to raise mo re cap ital; if it did not ra ise another $3 .5 million
in six months, it wo uld lose its right to nomin ate a majority of the
G enta boa rd. E' s continu ed status was not cl ea r. A pp are ntl y, Aries
could des ign ate its own CE O. VC protested the deal, offerin g to
adva nce a sli ghtl y large r amount of cash on the sam e terms. The
Genta board refu se d the offer. It s contract having fa iled it , VC
decided to seek judicia l protection in De laware. Genta's stat e of
incorporation. 100
For VC to have to go to court was to admit contract failure. Yet
V C's contract followed the overall p attern predicted by the CTM having repayment of th e senior security come due in the eve nt of eh.
Here , by implication , a*8~> was not a new business plan for the going
concern but the sale on a going concern basis of the firm 's producing
assets. More than crumbs off the table were at stake: G enta had one
profitable division; Aries saw realizable assets worth at least $3
million. Unfortunately, the del ay in triggering the cash red emption
right engineered by E had a disastrous impact on the value of VC's
interest. While VC sat on its hands waiting for Nasdaq, the cl osing of
the Aries loan gave Aries a priority interest to the proceeds of a
liquidation of the producing assets. In th e terms of the CTM , the
contingent control transfer provision in this venture capital contract
relied on an s - Nasdaq de listing- that was manipulable in addition
to being observable and verifiable . The delay in triggering put VC in
the position Eastern Ai rlin es' bo ndho lders had expe rienced a decade
earlier - watching the transfer of thei r co llateral to parties providing
new capital as the firm 's inside rs speculated on a low-probability
turnaround.
A ny number of contrac ting strategies could have ave rted this
problem . For example , an old-fashioned business covenant prohibiting
the incurrence of new debt and triggering a cash redemption right
would have chilled the A ries deal. In the alternative , the drafter might
have expanded the men u of rede mptio n triggers, keying the additional
entries to nega tive information ge nerated by Ge nta , such as cash flow
or other finan cial measures or production targe ts. This re turns us to

l08. / d. a t 1044 n. 6.
109. /d . a t lOS0-52.

l
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the problem o f identifyin g a n appropriate s. Like the CTM's s, re a l
world proxi es te nd to be im pe rfec t. Ind eed , as recent events
surrounding the Enron bankruptcy have r eminded us, many
accounting figur es use d as contracting sign a ls are m a nipulab le. The
so luti on to that problem li es in th e provision of a long menu of
triaaers.
But this can prese nt its own ope ra tion a l problems.. for tri gQers
co
ca n go off to o early o r too la te . O f co urse, an ea rl y tri ggering in vi tes
waiver by V C and attendant ren egot iati o n. But to the ex tent E ha s
bargaining p owe r, the waive r arg um ent will no t be ex ant e pers uasive.
In sum, the evo lution o r an effect ive se t of trigge rs ca n tak e exper ie nce
ac ross genera tion s of contracts. Me anwhil e, an outside, noncontroll in g
VC is always be tter oft with th a n \vitho ut o ne.
In the alternative . the prefe rre d stock contract might have gra nt ed
VC co ntrol of th e hna rd ot d irectors or a sea t o n the bo ard with <t
chance to influence a ne utral o uts id e director. As we ha ve see n. most
ve nture ca pi ta l co ntrac ts d o be stow one or the other. With VC in
charge in the boardroom , Gc nt a would have been steered toward
orderly liquidatio n, no las t-ditch fin ancing would have been in the
works, and no one would have bothered to del ay Nasd aq de listing.
With board control, investment and divide nd policy no longer presents
a problem from preferred's point of view. In som e situations the V C
control solution will be problematic fr om an efficiency point of view,
of course - this is a fundamental insight of the CTM. How like ly is
VC control to mea n inefficient choices ? Ce rtainly, in this context the
debt-like characteristics of preferred participation should not
contribute to this risk of suboptimal decisionmaking by causing the
preferred to e rr on the side of ri sk aversi on in fr aming an investment
plan. If we put E's private be nefit s to one side, the conversion
privil ege aligns the lo ng-te rm inte rests of the preferred and common
in 8~ states . Interests dive rge in 8" states, where, as in Adams, VC will
be ready to give up and liquidate earlier than will E. H ere both th e
CTM and the fa cts in Adams suggest that VC control in 81, states is
likely to be a superior arra ngement.
b. L egal Framework. Equity-Linked Investo rs v. Adams provid es a
good example of the judicial tre a tme nt accorded to preferred cl a ims.
The regime of judicial enforcement bears directly on the burden facing
the drafter of the preferr ed stock contract. Unless courts provide a
protective backstop aga inst opportunistic transfers of value a nd
stripping of rights, any co ntract package falling short of giving the
preferred outright boardroom control implies a risk of opportunism
unless its drafter man ages to specify all salient contingencies.
Unfortunately, D elaw are law holds out no seri o us promise or
fiduciary prote ct ion against Iss uer opportunism for prefe rred
stockholders. Under Delaware law, the preferred share the rol e of
fiduciary beneficiary with th e common only with resp ect to elem ents
of preferred participation constituting an equity participation id entical
-~
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to th at of th e common. Accordingly, th e preferred have a cause of
action along with the common whe re management e ngages in selfde aling tran sactio ns or neglige ntly misman ages the firm . In contrast,
where a preferred claim arises from rights an d prefere nces not shared
with the common, the Delaw are courts characterize t he claim as
contractual rat her than fiduciary. 110 The y th e n read the contract
narrowiy . 111
Accordingly, counsel for V C in Adams nee d ed to construct a claim
that clicl not derive from the li quidatio n prefcr;::nc;; a nd in s tead went to
the stock's core equity participatio n. It cle verly did this by making
reference to the Dela ware fidu ciary rul es constraini ng management
defensive tactics against hostile ta keovers . l'vio rc particularly, it
attacked th e Aries deal as sale of contro l within Revlon , Inc. v.
i'v!acAndrews & Forbes Ho ldings. In c. .11 ' prese nti ng VC in the capacity
of an equityholde r (rather than in th e capacity of a senior
securityhold er), protesting manage m ent's fai lure to ac t to maximize
the value of the firm in connection with a control transfer. If the deal
was within R evlon , the VC argued. then the Gen ta board had a duty to
maximize the value received in exchange for th e control transfer. By
refusing VC's better offer, it breached the duty.
T he Delaware Chancery court rejected the theory, despite a
significant counterfactual acknowledgment. It ad mitte d th at in an
open auction for the company he ld at the time of the Aries deal, VC's
interest in accessing the proceeds of liquidation would have caused its
bid to be the highest:
Assume, for example. that the present value of th e fi rm's prospec ts as a
goin g co ncern would be only $9 million (net). which is also its liquidation
va lu e . Assume that in an open biddi ng contest. a we ll in for m ed bidder
will offer th e company something less than 3 million for a 51% interest
(i. e .. $9mm + $3m m = $12mm divid ed by 2 = $6 mm: but since in
liquidation the common stock wo uld be worthless. the bidder would be
unlik ely to bid the m aximum $6mm value on these assumptions).
Assume such a $3mm bid would permit th e commo n stock some further
opportunity to see a payoff in the com pany labs and in th e marketplace.
Now ass um e that a bidding contest occ urs in wh ich the preferred takes
part. What will probably happen ? Th e preferred 's aim might be simply to
liqui date the company and tak e all of the net proceeds and app ly it to its
preference . This will prevent its exploitation by the common and cut its

110. 51'1' Jc dwab v. MG!vf Grand Hotels. Inc .. 509 A.2 d 584 (Del. C h . 1986) : Dalton v.
A m. ln v. Co .. 490 A.2d 574 (De l. C h. 1985) .
11 1. Kaiser Al uminum Corp. v. Mathe son. 681 A. 2d 392 (De l. 1996) ( refusin g to resort
to extrin sic evide nce in interpre ting pre fe rred stock co ntract and in stea d employing the
ma xim of interpretati on conrm profcrcnrum ); Wa rn er Communications Inc. v. C ri s-C raft
Indus .. Inc .. 83 A.2d 962 (Del. C h. 1989) (int er pre ting langu age lite rally protectin g prefe rred
stockhold e rs against th em) .
11 2. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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losses. To accomplish that go c.\1. the pre fe rred could easil y puy in an
aucti on up to $21 milli o n ($30 million liquidati on prefere nce minus
presen t n et li quidation va l ue) becw se th a t amount wou ld go iP to the
co mp a ny's treasury but co uld be immed ia te ly restored to t he preferred
wh en it exercised its vo ting puwcr to ca use the liquidation of the fir m .1 1'

But the compe titive b idd ing ::.;cena rio did not determin e the result in
the court's fiduciary analysis. The quest ion for p urposes of fiduciary
Jaw, it reason ed, was not whe th er the board of clirecrors had
ma ximized the va lue of lhc as:-;cts or of the firm. The fiduciary rr:g ime
addressed on ly the bo c,rcl's goud f;:;. ith in iJursuit of valu e fur the
comrnon stock interest:
Vlhat is clear is that the

CJ~ rr tc~

board \Vas striving to maxirnize

tht~

possibili ty of th e cornm on st cJCl.:: pa rtici pat in g in so me "upside"' ben efit
fro m the ccmmcrcial de\·c: !opment of th e com pany's i,l t,.: lkcwai
pro pert ies . lt is clear too tha t th e course it took to do that argu ab ly was
superior to an alt ernati\' t~ in whi ch th e preferred acqui re d umtroL
bec ause th e prd.crred had a financia l ince ntive to liquid a te the finn
imme diate ly. th us de priving the common of any c urrem va lu e . Thus,
unlik e two competing cash tra nsa ctions or transa ction in which wi de ly
traded se curities are offered . t he alte rn at ives that plain tiff poses a re rich
with legitimate . in deed unavo id ab le. occasions for the exercise of go od
faith business judgme nt.

[This is not) a situ a tion in wh ich. from th e co mm o n stock's perspe ct ive.
"there is no tomorro\v.'' a nd th e bo ard oug ht not be recognized as ha ving
discre tion to p re fer what it sees as a '' lon ge r term va lu e" o ver a hi gher
prese nt va lue . The court wo uld have no basis to conclude that the
immedia te valu e of th e co mm o n would in fac t be greater had an
a lte rnative of the kind presented by the preferre d som e h ow been put in
pl ace . ... 11 4

In effect, the Delaware co urt here declin ed to use fiducia ry iaw as
the basis for implying a maximizing control transfer mechanism. In so
doing it acted in accord with the structure of American fiduciary la w.
The law 's charge to the corporate board to work diligently and loyally
to enhance value is p hrased in terms of the overall " firm " only in
general articulations i 15 or in cases where the effect is to strengthen
management's hand against a hostile tender offer for the common

- - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - ---- - 113 . Eq ui ty -Lin ke d in ve stors . L P. v. A dams. 705 A .2cl1040. 1057 ( D e l. Ch. 1997) .
114. !d. at 1058-59 .
115. See. e.g.. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CO RPORATE GOVERNANC E: A>i ,\ LYSIS AND
RE CO M!YI EN D ATION S § 2.01 (199-q .
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stock. 110 Where board decisions implicate conflicting interests of
classes of equity securities (or conflicting interests of debt and equity
securities), and management acts to advance the interests of the
common stockholders, the value to be maximized becomes the value
of the common stock.
This alignment between fiduciary obligation and the common
stock's interest reflects first-generation agency theory. which held that
the residual interest holder has the value-maximizing incentive in all
going-concern situations outside the vicinity of insolvency. 117 The
CTM's primary lesson for the law is that this assumption is not nearly
. l..:.. ]] 0
as sa f.east 11e corporate 1aw 1'1terature seem s tot 111n
The legal primacy of the common stock interest also reflects
institutional concerns. In a hypothetical alternative regime, the board
is charged with maximizing firm va lue whatever the allocational
consequences among classes of securityholclers. 110 Information
asymmetries between the boardroom and the courtroom make
intervention to enforce such an open-ended maximization duty
impracticable. Courts do not have the technical wherewithal to review
corporate boards on the substance of their business decisions. They
prefer to limit inspection to process contexts, which implicate facts and
factors more immediately intelligible and amenable to judicial
reviewY 0 The courts also accord the board a wide zone of discretion in
which to resolve pie-slicing disputes among different classes of
securityholder. For example, had the Genta board decided in good
faith and upon clue diligence that the game was up - that the Aries
deal was one-sided and unlikely to lead to a turnaround and to put the
firm to the preferred in accord with their contract - the common

l16. The reference is to corporate law's constituency statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-756(d) (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 23·1·35-l(f) (West Supp. 2001): N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001-02).
ll7. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Atw!vsis uf rile Various Ruriona!es for 1Vfaking
Sharelzulders 1he Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corpomre Fiduciarv Duties. 21 STETSON L. REV.
23 (1991). Distress situations are the exception. There the equity has a number of perverse
incentives that can lead to reduction in the value of the finn's producing assets. See Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co .. 1991 WL 277613. at *33 &
n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
l18. For a contrasting economic approach to the same endpoint. sec Thomas A. Smith.
The Efficient Norm j(Jr Corporare Lmv: A Neorruditiunal!nterprerlllion of' Fiduciarv Dutv. 9:-\
MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999).
.
.
~
119. Morey W. McDanieL Bondholders and Stockho!dns. 13 J. CORP. L. 205 ( 1998):
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corpomre Coverllinlce. 4l Bus. LAW 413 ( l98o).
l20. See Paramount Communications. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc .. 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1993), where the Delaware Supreme Court moves Rev/on review away from business
substance in the direction of process review. Under QVC the question is less whether the
board maximizes value than whether the board informed itself of available alternative
courses of action respecting value maximization.
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stockholders would have be e n hard presse d to articulate an action for
breach of fiduciary duty. 12 1
The foregoing justification of the ruling in Equity-Linked
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, hc)\veve r, leaves open some problems. Since
Genta was in distress, governance in the common's interest was not
presumptively efficient. Furthermore. th e court could have ru led for
the preferred without in stituting an urnvorkable fiduciary regime .
Genta's delaying actions respecting Nasdaq delisting easily could have
been characterize d as a breach of th e contractua l duty to act in good
faith. Th e contract accorded the preferred a ri ght of redemption in the
event of delisting; but lor th e board's inte rvention with Nasd aq. th e
de listing would have occurred. perfecting the right. 122 Since the act ion
frustrated th e exercise of th e right , it arguably violated the contract
law good faith duty in its narrower articulation, und er which the duty
protec ts perfo rmance of th e contract 's explicit terms on ly and
implicates no broad, fid uciary-lik e duty of se lf-abnegation. Th e
foregoing characterization of the Adams situation is well within the
narrow statement of the duty, a formulation held applicable to senior
securities in Delaware cases. 123
It should be emphasized that the good faith rule referenced here is
a special rule that applies only to debt and preferred stock contracts. It
bears only the most tenuous familial relatio nship with the duty of good
fai th described in the R estatement 2d and taught in first year courses.
The Restatement's good faith standard invites aggressive application to
protect contract parties in positions of disadvantage. It constrains
opportunism to protect expectations. ~ A variant of this standard
ap plies when an interpreting judge concl udes that the contract
contains no term dictating a result on the facts of the case. In such an
"omitted term" case, the decisionmaker is invited to interpolate a term
fo llowing from community standards of fairness. Once again
125
aggressive intervention is invited. Two decades ago, plaintiffs invited
courts to apply these precepts aggressively to protect holders of bonds
and preferred stock. Instead , beginning with the famous case of Broad
12

121. Compare Orban v. Field. 1997 WL 153831 (De l. Ch. Apr. 1. 1997). a venture capita l
case in which the court sustains the board 's action to wipe o ut a common stockholde r in
favor of prefe rr ed classes ho lding a majo rity of the votes .
122 . H ad th e Genta board taken no steps to delay. de listing would have occ urred in
ea rl y Dece mber 1996. 705 A.2d 1040. I 047 (1997). De lilying til ctics caused dcli sting to be
delayed u ntil Fe bruary 4. 1997; the Genta boilrd approved th e A ri es deal on Janumy 28.
1997 ./r/. at 1051-52 & n.34.
123. Simons v. Cogan. 542 A.2cl 7i:l5 (Del. Ch. 1987) ; Katz v. Oak Indus. In c .. 508 A .2d
873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
124 . R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 cmt. a (1981).
125 .

!d.~

204 cmt. d .
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v. Rock;vefl internotional, h the courts invented a restnct1ve variant,
pmsuant to which the good faith duty is not breached unless an
articula u:d contract right has been violated. In rnost situations, this
bond and preferred good faith rule negates the Restatement's good
fRith regirnc. Good faith is a backstop duty intended to come to bear
to protect parties who do not have specific contract provisions to
the m. In the vast majority of cases, to require a contract term
first is to say .. no good faith duty." But there remains a subset of cases
in which the bond an d preferred good faith variant assists a victim of
1 7
Adams is in t his subset. '
unatcly for VC this is a small :'ubsct. The drafting burden on
p referred ren1ains so onerous as to rnake the little good faith
tectiu11 held out in the cases more theoretical than real. The judges
the terms of preferred stock contre1cts give the benefit of any
doubts to the common. Part of the burden stems from the fact that in
Dela\vare corporate politics often matter more than statements of
doctrine. Corporate politics have not historically favored preferred
claims because managers, who decide where to charter the firm, tend
to be the actors with political influence. Accordingly, contingencies
must be predicted with prescience and provided for in painstaking
detail if the preferred's expectations are not to be frustrated.
Is this an efficient approach? The law of preferred stock thereby
tracks the law and economics that refuses implied-in-fact and impliedin-law protections to corporate participants on the ground that in the
long run forcing them to negotiate contracts leads to efficient results.
But, as we have seen, 12s this rationale is q uestionable. The complete
contingent claims contract that the law thus demands as a vehicle for
protecting preferred in the absence of boardroom control arguably is
an economic impossibility. Preferred stock contracts traverse a
considerable expanse of noncontractible territory. Of course, we also
have seen that noncontractibility is not an absolute - the CT M, for
example, designs a contract term that indirectly steers the parties
toward an optimal solution of a noncontractible problem. But this also
is exac lly what the parties did in Adams, drafting a redemption
provision based on Nasdaq delisting. It is true that VC in Adams could
have l~xtracted a further explicit provision, one to the effect that E
would not acti vely seek to delay Nasdaq delisting. At this point,
hovvever, the forced contracting norm arguably has led us to an absurd

126. 6.+2 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane), ccrr. denied. 454 U.S. 965 (1981): see
n/s(J Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

!27. For a second example, see J-JB Korenvaes Investmenrs, L.P. v. lvfurriort Corp., 1993
VvL 257422 (Del. Ch. Jul. 1. 1993) (showing that anticlilution provisions governing an issue of
convertible prderrcd can fail on some fact patterns. requiring intervention under the good
fa ith rule).

128. See supm text accompanying notes 34-35.
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result. After all, there i~.; no such thing as a case where the dra fte r ot a
specific contract term could not have been even more specific.
The resulting message is disturbing: contractu al specifications
designed to protect prefe rred are intrimically unreliable beca use
reviewing courts welcome the open ing of loopholes on behalf of the
common stock. B ut for VC the upshot is clear: the only reliable
contracting course is to take boardroom control, full o r sh ared. Such a
narrowing of the menu o f meaningful contractual cho ices cannot
possibly be efficient.
2.

Conrm! 1 1! ihe Sh urehulders · i'vi eeiing

In the usual corporate power allocation , the board ot di rectors
manages the busin ess ,; nrl the shareholde rs e le ct the board. ~:~·J
Shareholder approval also i :~ needed for charter amendments, many
mergers, sales o f all or substantially a ll assets, and liquicl arions . 1-'11
Preferred stockholders also run into difficulties with respect to
exercises of this shareholder legisla tive function.
To see why, consider a stylized retelling of the facts of Bove v.
Community Hotel Corp. ~: This case concerned a corporation with an
issue of preferred on which no dividends had been paid for twentyfour years. The face amount of cumulated dividend arrearages was
greater than the going concern value of the entire equity of the finn.
T he board of directors determined to eliminate the arrearages,
ostensibly to make the firm a more attractive vehicle for debt
financing.
During the first half of the twentieth century, boards in this
position effected elimination of accumulated arrearages by
engineering direct ame ndments of their firms' charters. A conceptual
anomaly made this possible. The "preferred stock contract," unlike a
contract governing corporate de bt, is a part of the firm's charter. The
charter, in turn, is subject to a statutory process directive respecting
the power to amend. In the early twentieth century, most state
corporate codes provided that a simple majority vote of all
outstanding shares was sufficie nt to approve a charter amendme nt.
Literally applied, this meant that where (a) an issue of preferred stock
did not carry a majority of the votes of all issues of stock, and (b) the
preferred issue had been created without a special charter term
11

129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. ~ 141(a) (2001) .
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8.

~~

242.251.271.275 (20Cll).

13 l. 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 196LJ) . In the actual case. direct amendment of the: preferred stock
con trac t required a 100% approval by the preferre d and the merger required a class vote ot'
th e preferred . The re telling in the text substitutes the scenario that would have followed
under today 's Delaware statute . For a more recent example, see E!lioil Assocs., L.P. v.
Avatex Corp .. 715 A.2d 843 (Del 1998).
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req uirin g a separate vote of the preferred as a class to approve charter
amend ments implica tin g its inte rests, the rights a nd preferences of th e
prefe rred were subject to ex post strippin g for the benefit of th e
common through use of its charter amendm ent powe r. This was seen
as unfair, and many state courts invalid ated such actions o n a
constit uti ona l prope rty rights theory. But that judicial theory becam e
m o ribunc\. 1" 2
In response, sta te legisla tures adjusted state co rporat e codes ,
including Delaware's, so as to afford the preferred a process
protection . A majority vote of a given class of stockhold e rs would be
req uir ed w henever a charter amendme nt impaired that classes ·
contrac t rights. 1 ~ 3 The preferred issuer in B()\,'C . howeve r. found a way
to avo id that preferred class vote. Its board set up a shelL wholly
owned subs idiary and e ngin eered the m e rger of the iss uer corporation
into the she ll s ubsid ia ry. Under the '' m erger agreeme nt" between the
two corpo rat ions, th e com mon sto ck of the s urviving corporation
wo ul d be iss ue d to both th e common and th e preferred ot th e iss ue r
firm in proporti ons therein specified. Unde r the specificatio n , th e
und e rwate r common came away with a sli ce of firm value. The
" merger agreement" thus had the effect of stripping value from the
rights of the preferred specified in the ch arte r. Here the managers in
Bove exploited a second legal anomaly: in a merge r the charter of th e
transferor corpora tion is replaced by th e charter of the surviving
corporation. A merger, accordingly, is a charter-amending event.
T he me rger in Bove had to be submitted for shareholder a pprova l.
But the state cod e r eq uire d a class vote of th e preferred in the case of
a charter arnendm ent injuri o us to the prefe rred, b ut re quire d only a
vo te of all th e share ho ld e rs as o ne class for a m erger. In effect , th e sole
purpose of th e m e rger into the shell subsidi ary was to provid e a
vehicle for recapitalizing the firm's eq uity a nd e liminating the
preferred arrearages without a class vote of the preferred be ing
req uired. Yet the state co urt sustained th e merger. That the m e rger
was e ngineered sole ly for the purpose of e limin a ting the arrearages
a nd that the sta tut e provided for a cl ass vote (and veto) in its
instructions respecting th e direct means to th e e nd was neithe r here
nor there . Under corporate law's " doctrine of inde pe nd e nt lega l
significance ," first articula ted in Delaware in a similar case, different
sections of the corporate code are to b e read literally and
inde pendently. A policy implication of one secti o n does not provide a
co urt a basis for implying a limitation on th e utilization of anoth er
section. Accordingly , the provision for a class vote on changes
132. See supra tex t accompanying note 100.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242( b)(2) (2001). Even with a class vo te. publicly traded
preferred has been known to approve right-strippin g amendments. See, e.g .. Bowma n v.
A rmo ur & Co .. 160 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1959).
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injurious to the preferred's interest in the charte r amendme nt section
of the cod e does not imply a ge ne ral rule that prefe rred m ay in no
circumstances have its rights stripped absent a class vote. A s a res ult ,
the merger section may be used to strip prefer e nces from preferre d
because it literally does not provid e for class vote e ve n th o ugh
preference stripping was th e only purpose of the me rge r.
In gene ral, state corpo rate code s are not inte rprete d to possess
policy cohere nce. No embarrass me nt st em s fr om th e resulting
int erpreti ve anomalies. Instead , they a re ce le brat ed because th ey lend
fr ee dom of action to insiders.
Once again, the message [o r pre fe rre d hold e rs is ge t a better
contract. A nd indee d , pre fe rre d ca n co ntract aro und th e Bo ve
pro bl e m with a provi sion in the charter for a cla ss vote in conn ection
with m e rg e rs . 13 ~ But such provisions are rare in cha rt er prov isio ns
governing publicly issue d pre fe rred. A study conducte d in th e late
1980s of charters governin g prefe rre d iss ued by De !aware
corporations and listed on the New York Stock Exchange found that
only 14 % required a class vote in respect of a m erger. 135 Many issuers
have taken advantage of this failure to draft carefully , successfully
structuring mergers that transfer value from the preferred to the
common.
The Delaware courts have supported the issuers and their value
transfers. They ruled in the touchstone case of Rothschild v. Liggett
that preferred can be cashed out in a merger for substantially less than
its liquidation preference, a "merger" not being "liquidation" even
where the particular class of stock is being cashed out in the merger.u 6
Elsewhere , Delaware has sanctioned a merger where the managers of
th e transferor firm bargained clown the consideration fir st offered for
th e preferred by the acquiring firm even as they bargained up the
consideration on offer for the common. 137 Finally, in Delaware the
exercise of drafting a charter that actually provides for a class vote in a
merger has proved to be a game played by secret rules. In Warner
Comnwnicntions Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, In c. , ~.s the court held
that a provision requiring a two-thirds class vote to alter any
preferences, rights, powers or privileges of the preferred did not
operate in respect of a merger, even though the charter had a separate
1

134. Some sta tes. such as N ew York. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 903(a)(2)(8) ( McKinney
Su pp. 2002), provide for a cla ss vo te. D e lawa re does no t. DEL. C ODE A NN . tit. 8, § 251
(2001 ).
135. N ote, Arrearage E!im inmion an d rlze Prefe rred Srock Conrracr: A S urvev and a
Proposalfor R ef orm. 9 CA RDOZO L. R EV. 1335 ( !988).
136. Roth sc hild lnfl Co rp. v. Ligge tt Group. 474 A.2cl 133 (Del. 1984).
137. D alto n v. Am. In v. Co. , 490 A. 2d 574 (De l. Ch. 1985 ).
138. 583 A.2d 962 (Del. C h. 1989).
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firms moderate it by staging E 's draw clowns of capitaL 1 ''' by
diversifying their portfolios of investments in startup firms, by
syndicating investments in particular firms, and by closely monitoring
their positions. ~ vVhen a particular investment does turn out to be a
complet e failure. the contract structures priorities to allocate any
1511
crumbs le tt on the table to VC. But these often do not amount to
much.
Suboptimal or mediocre performance short ot complete failure
presents a less tractable problem , although not so much so with
venture capital portfolio companies as with mature preferred issuers.
vVith startup firms, indifferent results can lead directly to the disaster
scenario. Outsid e capital is needed for survival and poor results me an
that capital is cut off, given staged investment. In contrast_ poorly
performing mature firms can survive for years. with the option of
omitting to pay dividends on preferred being a factor assisting in that
surviva l. There are also drastic differences in duration between senior
securities issued by mature firms and venture capital preferred. The
preferred that concerned Graham and Dodd was issued in the early
and mid-twentieth century, before the inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.
In those clays , preferred stocks often had no mandatory redemption
schedule and thus, like common, had an indefinite cluration. 151 Venture
capital preferred tends to take an intermediate term, with a duration
of four to six years. 152 When the time is up, redemption rights become
exercisable, and the mediocre performer still limping along either
finds replacement capital or becomes a disaster case.
Mediocrity between startup and year five is a problem less easily
treated through advance specification. When value lies on the table
unmaximized, by definition a governance problem exists , although not
necessarily a verifiable one. As we have seen, the solution turns on
interve ntion by VC to replace E as CEO, and venture capital contracts
in most cases deal with this problem either by vesting boardroom
control in VC, or by making sure that boardroom control remains
contestable. Given the latter situation, and a neutral outside director
with a deciding vote, opportunistic stripping of preferred rights and
preferences seems unlikely. Even if such a resolution passes in the
boardroom, the VC is safe so long as it possesses voting control at
shareholders' meetings. Kaplan and Stromberg's numbers on voting
control thus show us that the preferred stock problem is solved in
1

0

1-+E\. Sahlman. supra note 7, at 507.
l4LJ. GO MPERS & LERNER. supm note 71. at 139-202.
l:'\0. Some ve nture capital firms have members who specialize in this downsid e cleanup
function. I owe this point to Professor Marcus Cole.
!51. Morey McDanieL Sinking Fund Preferred Stock. 13 FIN. MGT. 45-52 (Spring 1984).
152. Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 12.
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70.8% of cases with no vesting of E equity and 55.8% with full vesting .
Since the preferred stock prob lem tends to arise in e,, states and
vesting is unlikely to be full in those state s, stripping of VC
preferences and o the r downside opportunism turns out to be a
possibility in about on e-third of the cases. But it also should be no ted
that merge rs a nd acqui sitions occ ur in 9~ stales as well. So the
possibility of stripping still exists in the 45 % of ful l ves ting cases where
VC does not have vo ting con tro l.
To what exte nt are these minorit y-vo te VCs threatened by
opportunism from majority vote Es due to their status as preferred
holders? Th e pr imary limit ations on exposure are built into the
transaction s· overall economic structure. These dea ls have a limited,
intermediate term, with E being requi red to raise cash to r edeem the
preferred in e" stat es. Prior to liquidati on . boardroom control remains
contestable in 58°ft> of th e cases where the VC docs not have voting
co ntrol. So the window fo r opportunism opens in on ly a minority of
cases and stays open for only a short pe riod. Of course, A dams shows
how a majority-vote E can strip value even during this short period.
The degree to which value and righ ts can be stripped in this
minority of cases depends on fine points of contracting practice. T he
literature shows that standard ven ture capital preferred contracts
provide for cl ass votes in respect of adve rse charter amen dments,
increases in the numbe r of authorized shares, and the authorization of
preferred classes of higher priority. 153 Mergers are treated separate ly
under a one-size-fits-all term. A merger is treated as a liquidation,
triggering a right to redeem the preferred if the ''stockholde rs of the
Company immediately prior to [closing of the transaction] own less
than 50% of the Compan y's voting power" the reafter. If the merger is
treated as a liquidation , a class vo te also is provided for. If the merger
is not treated as a liquidation, no class vote is provided for. 154
This one-size-fits-all term is substantially effective, even as it falls a
step short of pe rfection. T he term manifestly is designed to overrule
Rothschild v. Liggett's ruling that a cash-out merger is not a
liquidation. 155 Where all of the shares of the transferor firm in the
merger are cashed out, the term manifestly achieves its intended
purpose. The preferred liquida tion rights become immediately
153. See Dauchy. supra note 75 . at 315; see also H ank Barry. Negotillling Prelimin11ry
Financing , in 20TH A NNUAL INSTIT UTE ON COMPUTER LAW 849. 860 (PLI Patents.
Copyright, T rade marks. and Literary Property. Course Handbook Seri es No. 590. 2000) .
154. El len B. Corenswet e t al. , Venture Capiw/ Considermio ns in /v!ergers and
Acquisitions, in H AN DLI NG MERGERS & ACQU ISITIO NS IN HI GH-TECH 1\ND EM ERGING
GROWTH ENVIRONM ENTS 1999. at 655. 661 -62 (PLI Co rp. L & Prac ., Course H andbook
Series No. 1122. 1999): Dauchy, supra no te 75 , a t 317: Richard R Plumridge, Typic11/
Venrure Capital Transaction Docu!llenls. in PRIVATE PLAC EM ENTS 2001. at 817, 856-57 (PLI
Corp. L. & Prac .. Course Handbook Se ri es No. 1239, 2001).
155. See supra text accompan ying note 136.
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exercisable, and the preferred gets a class vote that allo ws it to veto
the merger. But the preferred with a min ority of the overstl sh<clfe s will
not be protected und er thi s provision in all cases. I-l e re are three
examples.
(a ) X Co . has 6,000 shares of common outstanding held bv E
amounting to 60 % of its totai shares ( 6.000 total)~ 4,000 shares ( 40 % )
of preferred are held by VC. T he liquidation V0.lue of th e p re ferr ed is
$100 (or $400.000). X Co.'s total value is $.500,000. J\.cquiring finn A
Cu., w hi ch is controlled by th e third directo r of )( Co., organizes a
shell acq uisition subsidiary, A Sub. which issues to A Co. 5.000
common shares. A Sub m erges into X Co. pursuant to a merger
agreement providing that 5Jl00 of the 6,000 X Co . cornmon shares :_ue
to he converted into $40 cash. T he o ther LOOU X c·o. co mmon ::; hares
arc left to ride , <:l S are the p refe rred shares. T he sh ares of A Su b me
conve rted into 5,000 co mmon shares of X Cu. Simultaneously with th e
closing of the m erger, X Co. bo rrows the $200,000 to be paid to its
common stock in the merger, giving the lender a note and mortgage
on X Co.'s property. A Co. also takes a long-term option to buy the
remaining 1,000 shares of X Co. for $20.
In this deal, when the shooting stops, the acquirer has bought
exactly SO% of the target common, there by avoiding trigger ing
liquid ation. The preferred has no incentive to convert to common
prior to the closing since the value of the X Co. into which it would
convert is less than its liquidation preference. The preferred is better
off holding to maturity. A Co. is doing a leveraged speculation on an
increase in X Co.'s equity value, using th e assets of X Co. as a
borrowing base and putti ng in no significant capital of its own. It must
de lay purchase of t he remaining 10% of X Co . to av o id triggering
liquid ation and a class vote. But it can bide its time on that purchase
-the remaining common has no incentive to defect to the side of the
VC in internal votes. As in Adams, the VC cannot block the borrowing
unless a debt covenant is included in the preferred s tock contract.
W ithou t a debt covenant, and assuming both liquidation at maturit y
and th at X Co. still is worth only $500,000 , VC now receives $300,000
rather than $400,000. Its equity upside rides largely un affected.
The convoluted structure of the hypothesized m erger shows that
the standard venture preferred merger provision is effective across a
broad range of merger and acquisition territory: normall y, the
acquiring firm wants at least 51% of the vo ting equity. But the
hypothetical also shows that a loo phole can be opened in a pinch.
W it h value on the ta ble to be stripped, that cannot be considered an
event wit h a de minimis probabil ity. As to the use of busin ess
covenants which wou ld block the borrmvi ng in the forego ing
hypo thetical, the literature signals variations in practice. Some law yers
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suggest th at business cove nant s sho uld be included in th e ·'investor
rights agree ment'" usu ally e ntered into between VC an d E. 1'" O t her
descriptions of stand a rd d eal documentation n tak c~ no rncntio n of
business coven a nts. T h e Kapla n and Strc)mb erg n umbers indirect ly
suggest th a t b usi ness cove na nts are the exception rather than the rule.
They re port th at 20 % o f th eir cases in vo lved con tract provisio ns
co nti nge nt on subsequent fin a ncia l perform ance. hut none of the
provisio ns th ey describe are negative cove na n ts. 1' 7
( b) T he firm this time is Y Co ., with commo n h,;] d by E amounting
to 60 rYo of the shares (6 ,000 tot al) an d the preferred held by VC 40%
r J. oo· C) to tal) T h"" i; r··1'1 id ation valw' of the rw~ r"''·:· ,~ cl i... ,. <r 1 r;' O (o ~
$400,000) . The total value of Y Co. is $640.000. Y Co . me rges into B
Co ., which has 6000 shares of common outstand in g prior to th e
. ~hJL.-\~,
' ' ?: II) f)(
\(\
merger . l1ie tota~] rncrger cons1.d erat1.on IS
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Y Co.'s two classes of stock d ifferent ially so tar as concerns
co nsid erat ion . Each shar e o f common ge ts one sha re of the sur viving
co rporati on worth $80 pe r share if no prefe rre d is co nverted prior to
t he m erger; the stock is worth $64 if all of the p referred is con vert ed
prior to the m e rge r. The preferred gets cash worth $40 p e r sha re.
H ere , since more than 50 % of the stock o f the surviving corporation is
held by Y Co. ho lde rs, the liquidation/class vote provisio n is not
triggered. Given a conversion privilege, the preferred ca n co nvert into
common o n a one-to-o ne basis prior to the merger closing. If all of the
preferred converts 10,000 shares will sh are the merger considera tion,
which will thus be worth $64 per share . If the merger were a
liquida tion, the p referred wo uld h ave a r ight to rece ive $100 per share
in cash.
O nce again , the scenario is convo luted. T h is merger ave rts
triggering the clause only because th e acquiring corporation has the
sam e n umbe r of commo n shar es ou tstanding as the ta rge t. Postmerger, Y Co. common and B Co. common each hold 6,000 shares. If
VC converts , form e r Y Co. investo rs hold 10,000 o f 16,000. S ince , by
hypothesis , the Y Co . sh ares are held by a ha ndful of actors , cont ro l in
effect passes to Y Co. actors, som e thing t he fi r m in B Co.'s position is
unlikely to co un tenance . It is more likely in the case of stock-for-stock
deal like this t hat the B Co. holders e nd up with a cl ear m ajority . T hat

156. P !u m ridge. :w pm not e 154. at 647 ; Kathryn K. Li ndau e r. Crirical Issues in
Nego tiating Venwre Capira! for rhe Sofiware D eveloprne/71 Com pany. in 19TH A NNUA L
INSTITUTE ON COiviPUT ER L.-\W 799. 321-22 (PLI Pate nts. Copy ri g h t. Tra dema rks. a nd
L iterary Pro pe rty. Course H a ndbook Serie s No . .547. 1999) .
1.57. Kaplan & Stromberg . supm note 12 (v>'o rking pape r at l9 & tb l. 6) . !t is e ntire ly
possible that Kapla n a nd Strom be rg were not looking to see if th e in vestor ri g hts ag ree m e nts
in th e ir tran sacti o ns con ta ined business cove na nts. It a lso is possibl e to d raft neg ative
co ve nan ts th a t do no t turn o n fu t ure fin a nci a l pe rfonmlilce figur es. O ne ca n. for exa m ple .
complet e ly fo rbid shor t te rm borrowing a nd fun ded de b t w itho ut reg ul a tin g it by refe re nce
to a ba lance she e t test.
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case , of course. triggers the clause . A ltern atively, B Co. pays in cas h,
d ebt securiti es. nonvoting common , or a mix of any of those w ith
vo ting stock. In all of those cases, the dea l in all probab ility triggers
the clause.
(c) O ne glarin g loophole remains: th e fac t pattern of th e Bove case
desc ribed above. Th is time the firm is Z Co. It has 6000 shares of
cummon o utstandin g held by E amounting to 60% of it s total sh a res
(0,000 tota l); 4,000 shares (40 % ) of preferred are held by VC. The
liquidation va lue of the prefe rred is $100 (or $400,000): the divid e nds
are cumu lat ive and $100.000 in arrea rs. Z Co . 's total va lue is $500.000.
Z Co . crea tes a shell , wholly owned subsidiary, EZ Co rp .. and merge s
into it. P ursuant to the m erger agreeme nt (dra fted by £) . th e
prefe rred and common of Z Co. are to rece ive commo n o f EZ Corp ..
5,001 sha res to th e common a nd 4,999 sha res to the preferred. Since
the vot ing stock of the s urviving corpora tion is held by the sa me
holders as the voting stock of th e transferor corporation, the clause is
not triggered and VC cannot block the deal under the contract. VC
will have a plausible case for breach of fiduciary duty and will be able
to bring an appraisa l proceeding pursuant to which it will be able to
claim the value of its shares in cash. Both lawsuits are powerful
weapons, but expensive. A roadblock built into the contract would be
cheaper.
O ne wonders why the drafters of venture capital documents have
not take n the simple step of forbidding a ny and all me rgers abse nt a
preferred class vo te. In a negotiation over such a term, the anticipated
objection would be that across-the-board vetoes in VC create the ir
own risk of opportunism- the VC with a veto can hol d up the dea l so
as to ex tract a disproportiona tely large consideration. But E already is
takin g that risk with respect to all deals entailing a control transfer,
and the more fully drafted term does not materially e nhance its
exposure.
C.

Summary

W hether the glass of protection for preferred stockh olders on th e
middle ground between draw down and redemption is half empty or
half full remain s a question. The venture capital arrangements
discussed here derive many of their features from the p rac tice of sma ll
b usiness planning. Fitted to the startup firm 's closely held status , th ese
contrac ts are int ensely relat io na l as they simultaneously encourage
entrepreneurs to maximize firm value whil e blocking opportunism
agai nst ou tside capital. They also refl ect the fac t that venture
capita lists are not passive inves tors. Portfolio compani es look to them
for manage ment assistance and service as reputational intermediaries

•
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with custom e rs and s uppli e rs . '~ No diffusion of this contracting
patte rn to m a ture issu ers and th e pub lic sec uriti es markets which
concerned Grah am and Dodd should be ex pected .
1

CONCLUS IO"'

This Ar ticle 's cho ice of incomplete contrac ts economics to describe
ven ture capita l co ntracts has no rmat ive implicat ions . T he economics
sugges t th a t ex post Coasia n barga inin g is no t a ve hicle we ll s uite d to
opt im a l ince ntive a lig nm ent in co rp orct ti o ns. Acco rdingly , when
governa nce dispute s erupt , a se t o f instructiuns nee ds to come from
som ew here . T he eco no mics a lso sugge st a zo ne of preference for
sha red con trol a nd process over ad va nce speci fic at io n . Accordingly,
instructions will not always co me in th e form of advance contract
sp ecifications, and the legal system will be o n ca ll to provide thirdparty umpires.
On the m a tter of judicial um piring, standard law and economics
joins with the Delaware courts to counse l against interventio n to
protect re lational victims on th e th eory that transacting p ar ties should
be encouraged to specify eve ryth ing in advance in contracts.
A lte rn ative ly, when the interests of common and senior holders
conflict, law and economics again joins with Delaware in presuming in
favor of the common. Here the theory is that short of an extrem e
distress situation, value is maxi mize d whe n management decisions are
aligned with the interests of the residual risk holder.
Th e incomple te contracts economics presented in this Article
sugges ts a more circumspect approac h. Whe re subject matter is
noncontractible, a blanket pres umpti o n against ex post inte rvention
on the gro und of forced contract is in cohe re nt. Furthe rmore , the
control transfer model shows that efficien t results an d the int erests of
senior sec urityholders arc aligne d in a la rger se t of cases than
previo usly supposed. When disputes betwee n ve nture capitalists and
e ntrepren e urs come to court, a ro tc pres umption favoring th e
common stockh old er is not defensible on efficiency grounds.
A lega l case arises for bett er treatm ent of preferred. A s presented
h ere , the case as ks for very little. No new fiduciary duty has to be
implied. No n ew corporate tort need be in ven ted . Conventional
contract law m erely needs to be applied in an evenhand ed way. So
doing wo uld only enhance the reviewing court's reputation for
respon sive ness to business interests.

l5 S. Sah lm an, supro no te 7, a t 508. Fo r a forma l of the in te ra cti ve re lat io nship of
ve nture ca pitali sts a nd ent repreneurs at the draw clown stage. se e Rafael R e pull o & Javier
Sua rez, Vemu rc Capira! Finan ce: A Sec uriry Dnign Approuc!z (SSRN Eke . Paper Co li. No.
145 134, 1999). ar http://pape rs.ss rn .com/abstrac t= 145 134.

